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  INTRODUCTION   
No problem has ever been solved by ignoring it. So why is 
it that regulators have largely turned their backs to issues of 
cumulative exposure from chemicals and pesticides? Why is it 
that more than 85,000 chemicals are approved for distribution 
in the United States1 and yet there are no routine assessments 
of public health risks from the combined exposure to multiple 
chemicals over multiple pathways? It is certainly not because 
policymakers or scientists fail to understand the importance of 
cumulative risk to issues of public health. The risk science lit-
erature routinely and openly acknowledges that cumulative 
risk assessments are the tool for tackling real-world problems 
of exposure.2 Individuals, after all, do not live in a bubble. And 
chemical exposure is not neatly and independently divided be-
tween fire retardants in couches, BPA in plastics, and endo-
crine disruptors in soaps. No. Life is messy and full of com-
pounding consequences.3 
 
 1. About the TSCA Chemical Substance Inventory, U.S. ENVTL. PROTEC-
TION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/tsca-inventory/about-tsca-chemical 
-substance-inventory (last visited Apr. 24, 2017) (“The Inventory was initially 
published in 1979, and a second version, containing about 62,000 chemical 
substances, was published in 1982. The TSCA Inventory has continued to 
grow since then, and now lists about 85,000 chemicals.”). 
 2. See, e.g., Sarah S. Gallagher et al., Cumulative Risk Assessment Les-
sons Learned: A Review of Case Studies and Issue Papers, 120 CHEMOSPHERE 
697, 698 (2015); see also infra Part I.A (discussing the risk science literature). 
 3. Major environmental laws like the National Environmental Policy 
Act, the Clean Air Act, and the Clean Water Act have some regulatory provi-
sions aimed at understanding cumulative impacts of their targeted regulatory 
programs. For example, the Clean Air Act sets national ambient air quality 
standards (NAAQS) for six criteria pollutants and requires states to adopt im-
plementation plans that ensure the aggregate air emissions in that state will 
not exceed the ambient standards. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408–7410 (2012). Similarly, 
the Clean Water Act requires states to develop Total Maximum Daily Loads 
(TMDLs) for all water bodies that fail to meet ambient water quality stand-
ards. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (2012). These TMDLs provide a means of addressing 
water quality problems that arise from multiple point sources, unregulated 
nonpoint sources, and background levels of pollution that collectively impair a 
water body despite the issuance of individual discharge permits. For an in-
depth discussion of TMDLs, see OLIVER A. HOUCK, THE CLEAN WATER ACT 
TMDL PROGRAM: LAW, POLICY, AND IMPLEMENTATION (2d. ed. 2002). Finally, 
the National Environmental Policy Act requires all federal agencies to consid-
er cumulative impacts of their proposed actions by accounting for the com-
bined impacts of past, present, and future projects on a particular resource. 
See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (2016) (defining “cumulative impact” in the Coun-
cil on Environmental Quality regulations that implement NEPA). While these 
provisions aimed at ameliorating aggregate harm have met only moderate 
success, the point is that Congress at least recognized that addressing indi-
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Despite evolutions in scientific thinking, the implementa-
tion of the two major federal environmental laws most directly 
impacting the entry of chemicals and pesticide to the market-
place—the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA)4 and the Fed-
eral Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)5—
have largely ignored issues of cumulative risk. With some lim-
ited exceptions, chemicals and pesticides are regulated on a 
chemical-by-chemical basis instead of based on real-world ex-
posures. And though legal scholars have long agreed that chem-
ical regulation was broken under TSCA,6 cumulative impacts—
the heart of public health concerns—had been virtually absent 
from proposals to reform TSCA.7  
This is not to say that both the old and new legal frame-
works are incapable of addressing cumulative risk or that Con-
gress did not appreciate the need to do so. In fact, Congress 
recognized that cumulative exposures to chemicals lie at the 
heart of public health risks when it enacted TSCA forty years 
ago.8 And in the separate realm of pesticide legislation, Con-
gress amended FIFRA twenty years ago to address aggregate 
 
vidual dischargers or emitters would not necessarily ensure that the aggregate 
levels of pollution were sufficient to protect public health. 
 4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2629 (2012). 
 5. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136–136y (2012). 
 6. For a sampling of the critiques leveled against the TSCA, see Tracy 
Bach, Better Living Through Chemicals (Regulation)? The Chemical Safety 
Improvement Act of 2013 Through an Environmental Public Health Law Lens, 
15 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 490, 495–506 (2014) (discussing the TSCA’s “[p]oor [t]rack 
[r]ecord”); Noah Sachs, Jumping the Pond: Transnational Law and the Future 
of Chemical Regulation, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1817, 1825–31 (2009) (discussing 
the “TSCA’s [t]roubles”). For a similar set of criticisms aimed at FIFRA, see 
Thomas O. McGarity, Politics by Other Means: Law, Science, and Policy in 
EPA’s Implementation of the Food Quality Protection Act, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 
103, 110–20 (2001). 
 7. See, e.g., John S. Applegate, Synthesizing TSCA and REACH: Practi-
cal Principles for Chemical Regulation Reform, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 721 (2008) 
(laying out principles for reform without proposing a regulatory approach 
aimed directly at cumulative risk). 
 8. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1679, at 61 (1976) (Conf. Rep.) (“Oftentimes an 
unreasonable risk will be presented because of the interrelationship or cumu-
lative impact of a number of different substances or mixtures. The conferees 
intend that the Administrator have authority to protect health and the envi-
ronment in such situations.”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1341, at 33 (1976) 
(“Because of the multiple avenues by which humans and the environment are 
exposed to a substance or mixture and because substances and mixtures do 
not occur in the environment in isolation, risks may result from complex in-
teractions or because of cumulative effects.”). 
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risks of pesticides in the limited areas of food residues.9 This 
amendment, in fact, inspired the U.S. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA) to develop a framework for cumulative risk 
assessment, touting its importance to understanding how 
chemicals proliferation impacts human health.10 
One should be careful, however, not to conflate regulatory 
potential or nonbinding frameworks with regulatory action. In 
fact, while there is some regulatory potential in the area of cu-
mulative risk assessment, that promise is yet untapped. To 
date, cumulative risk exists only at the regulatory fringe. With-
out a concerted effort to bring the issues to the forefront, the 
trend toward a myopic, chemical-by-chemical analysis of the 
risks is likely to continue. In 2016, President Obama signed 
chemical reform legislation in law: the Frank R. Lautenberg 
Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act (“new Act” or “Chem-
ical Safety Act”). That Act, like its predecessor, is largely silent 
on how and whether to integrate concerns about cumulative 
risk into the new framework. 
How can this be? It is, after all, no secret that we live in a 
world full of chemicals. Not infrequently, the popular press 
runs a feature article reminding us that “chemicals are every-
where,”11 that chemicals commonly used in consumer products 
 
 9. The Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-170, 110 
Stat. 1489 (2012) (amended FIFRA by setting a safety limit on pesticide resi-
dues on food for the first time in history); see also 21 U.S.C. § 346a (2012). 
Those safety limits are supposed to be set after evaluating the aggregate expo-
sure to individual pesticides. Id. While this sounds promising, the FQPA is 
limited in scope, leaving chemicals in consumer products unaddressed as well 
as some of the most widely applied pesticides. In addition, the implementation 
of the FQPA’s mandates on aggregate exposure have been criticized as unsuc-
cessful. See also infra Part III.B. 
 10. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FRAMEWORK FOR CUMULATIVE RISK AS-
SESSMENT, U.S. (2003), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-11/ 
documents/frmwrk_cum_risk_assmnt.pdf [hereinafter EPA, FRAMEWORK] 
(“[C]umulative risk assessment may be the best tool available to address cer-
tain questions dealing with multiple-stressor impacts.”). 
 11. See, e.g., Elizabeth Grossman, Untested Chemicals Are Everywhere, 
Thanks to a 39-Year-Old US Law. Will the Senate Finally Act?, THE GUARDIAN 
(Feb. 13, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2015/feb/13/us 
-senate-toxic-chemicals-law-health-safety (“Toxics ‘are still shockingly common 
in our food and everyday objects.’”); Nicholas Kristof, Contaminating Our Bod-
ies with Everyday Products, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2015), https://nytimes.com/ 
2015/11/29/opinion/sunday/contaminating-our-bodies-with-everyday-products 
.html (“In recent weeks, two major medical organizations have issued inde-
pendent warnings about toxic chemicals in products all around us.”); David S. 
Martin, 5 Toxics that Are Everywhere: Protect Yourself, CNN (May 31, 2010), 
http://www.cnn.com/2010/HEALTH/05/31/chemical.dangers (“A growing body 
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are not as safe as once thought,12 that some chemicals now have 
background levels in the ambient environment,13 and that oth-
ers are found in elevated levels of our children’s bloodstreams.14 
Those paying attention are forced to grapple with the idea that 
babies come “pre-polluted” with endocrine disruptors,15 or that 
our waters are contaminated with microbeads from personal 
care products.16 
It is also no secret that for decades the major federal chem-
icals and pesticide laws in the U.S. have left the toggle switch 
open, allowing tens of thousands of chemicals to enter the mar-
ket (and consequently the environment) with little assurance of 
safety and almost no consideration of the collective consequenc-
 
of research is linking five chemicals—among the most common in the world—
to a host of ailments, including cancer, sexual problems and behavioral is-
sues. . . . In short, every room in almost every house in the United States is 
likely to contain at least one of these chemicals, many of which did not exist a 
century ago.”); Daniel Neides, Everyday Toxins Poison Our Best Intentions: 
Words on Wellness, CLEVELAND.COM (May 6, 2016), http://www.cleveland.com/ 
lyndhurst-south-euclid/index.ssf/2016/05/everyday_toxins_poison_our_bes 
.html (“The problem we now face is the incredible toxic load forced upon us 
every day.”). 
 12. Nathaniel Rich, The Lawyer Who Became DuPont’s Worst Nightmare, 
N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Jan. 6, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/10/ 
magazine/the-lawyer-who-became-duponts-worst-nightmare.html (discussing 
how the toxicity of PFOA, a chemical used in products like teflon, was known 
and yet covered up by DuPont and has since found its way into drinking water 
supplies from Pennsylvania to Washington); see also Sharon Lerner, The Tef-
lon Toxin: DuPont and the Chemistry of Deception, INTERCEPT (Aug. 11, 2015), 
https://theintercept.com/2015/08/11/dupont-chemistry-deception (discussing 
DuPont’s PFOA scandal). 
 13. See DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. & CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, FOURTH NATIONAL REPORT ON HUMAN EXPOSURE TO ENVIRON-
MENTAL CHEMICALS: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 (2009) (describing its extensive 
biomonitoring program to understand exposures to “environmental chemicals,” 
which are defined as a “chemical compound or chemical element present in air, 
water, food, soil, dust, or other environmental media, such as consumer prod-
ucts”). 
 14. See id. at 3 (reporting the widespread presence of commonly used in-
dustrial chemicals like fire retardants, BPA, and PFOA in the blood and urine 
samples of study participants). 
 15. Kristof, supra note 11; see also Sara Goodman, Test Finds More than 
200 Chemicals in Newborn Umbilical Cord Blood, SCI. AM. (Dec. 2, 2009), 
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/newborn-babies-chemicals 
-exposure-bpa (reporting on a study from the Environmental Working Group 
that tested umbilical cord blood from newborns and found traces of 200 chemi-
cals in their blood, including traces of twenty-one pesticides). 
 16. Rachel Abrams, Fighting Pollution from Microbeads Used in Soaps 
and Creams, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/ 
23/business/energy-environment/california-takes-step-to-ban-microbeads-used 
-in-soaps-and-creams.html. 
  
2318 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [101:2313 
 
es. Over 85,00017 chemicals are manufactured and distributed 
in the United States; in addition, over 20,000 formulations of 
about 675 active pesticide ingredients are sprayed on our food, 
lawns, homes, and commercial offices.18 For many of these 
chemicals, little is known by way of safety or public health con-
sequences.19 
Still, at the moment when we should recognize the daunt-
ing collective action problem before us, at the moment when as-
sessing cumulative risk and regulating to reduce that risk seem 
the logical next step, a curious piece of advice has become a 
common refrain: individual vigilance. Again and again we are 
told that we can protect ourselves, our families, and unborn ba-
bies by becoming informed consumers.20 We are lured by the 
promise that as individual non-experts we can arm ourselves 
with the tool of information and live a healthy life. Debra Lynn 
 
 17. See About the TSCA Chemical Substance Inventory, supra note 1 (“The 
Inventory was initially published in 1979, and a second version, containing 
about 62,000 chemical substances, was published in 1982. The TSCA Invento-
ry has continued to grow since then, and now lists about 85,000 chemicals.”). 
 18. McGarity, supra note 6, at 110. Europeans fare no better in the quest 
to avoid chemicals in everyday life. A survey of British females by deodorant-
maker Bionsen revealed that the average UK woman wears 515 chemicals a 
day. Paul Casciato, Average UK Woman Wears 515 Chemicals a Day, REUTERS 
(Nov. 19, 2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-cosmetics 
-idUSTRE5AI3M820091119. In addition, Danish researchers concluded that 
the total amounts of endocrine disrupters absorbed by two-year-old children 
constitute a risk for both anti-androgenic disruptions and estrogen-like dis-
ruptions of their sexual development. See KATHE TØNNING ET AL., SURVEY AND 
HEALTH ASSESSMENT OF THE EXPOSURE OF 2-YEAR-OLDS TO CHEMICAL SUB-
STANCES IN CONSUMER PRODUCTS: SURVEY OF CHEMICAL SUBSTANCES IN 
CONSUMER PRODUCTS, DANISH ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NO. 102, at 40 (2009), 
http://www2.mst.dk/udgiv/publications/2009/978-87-92548-81-8/pdf/978-87 
-92548-82-5.pdf.  
 19. See Wendy E. Wagner, Commons Ignorance: The Failure of Environ-
mental Law To Produce Needed Information on Health and the Environment, 
53 DUKE L.J. 1619, 1623–24 (2004) (“Despite the enormous growth in envi-
ronmental law and regulation since the 1970s, much of the scientific infor-
mation needed to ensure environmental protection is still missing. . . . Scien-
tific knowledge is insufficient to identify, much less test for, a variety of 
invisible hazards associated with household products . . . . Ignorance prevails 
in spite of elaborate licensing requirements that purport to protect the public 
health and environment from these hazards.”). 
 20. See, e.g., MIKE ADAMS, FOOD FORENSICS: HIDDEN TOXINS LURKING IN 
YOUR FOOD AND HOW YOU CAN AVOID THEM FOR LIFELONG HEALTH (2016); 
DEBRA LYNN DADD, TOXIC FREE: HOW TO PROTECT YOUR HEALTH AND HOME 
FROM THE CHEMICALS THAT ARE MAKING YOU SICK (2011) (“There is no longer 
any question that consumer products contain toxic chemicals harmful to our 
families. But how do we protect ourselves, and where do we start?”). 
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Dadd, dubbed the Queen of Green by the New York Times,21 be-
gins her latest book on how to avoid toxins in the home by say-
ing “I speak to you not as a doctor, scientist, or toxicologist, but 
as an educated consumer.”22 
Perhaps because an alternative message is too overwhelm-
ing to accept, we continue to pair the reality that “there are 
80,000 synthetic chemicals in commerce today” with “the good 
news about what is in our control, the steps we can take to help 
our bodies remove our toxic burden—and what we can do to 
avoid it in the first place.”23 In one New York Times article 
about the omnipresence of endocrine disruptors and the long-
term reproductive impacts that pre-natal exposure can have on 
babies when they become adults, we are given this helpful ad-
vice: 
For now, experts say the best approach is for people to try to protect 
themselves. Especially for women who are pregnant or may become 
pregnant, and for young children, try to eat organic, reduce the use of 
plastics, touch cash register receipts as little as possible, try to avoid 
flame-retardant couches.24 
Admittedly, this message of individual vigilance does bear 
intuitive appeal. After all, the message implies that individuals 
have control over their own toxic risk profiles. At least for those 
with means, time, education, and cultural support, there might 
be some comfort in thinking that public health implications 
 
 21. About Toxic Free, PENGUIN RANDOM HOUSE, http://www 
.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/308971/toxic-free-by-debra-lynn-dadd/ 
9781585428700 (last visited Apr. 24, 2017). 
 22. DADD, supra note 20, at iii. 
 23. Promotional Materials for Toxin Toxout, GOOGLEPLAY, https://play 
.google.com/store/books/details?id=1W5-AgAAQBAJ&source=productsearch& 
utm_source=HA_Desktop_US&utm_medium=SEM&utm_campaign=PLA& 
pcampaignid=MKTAD0930BO1&gl=US&gclid=CNGiiIGa38wCFUaWfgod 
TM0A-Q&gclsrc=ds (last visited Apr. 24, 2017); see BRUCE LAURIE & RICK 
SMITH, TOXIN TOXOUT: GETTING HARMFUL CHEMICALS OUT OF OUR BODIES 
AND OUR WORLD (2014); see also RICK SMITH & BRUCE LOURIE, SLOW DEATH 
BY RUBBER DUCK: THE SECRET DANGER OF EVERYDAY THINGS (2011); GILLIAN 
DEACON, THERE’S LEAD IN YOUR LIPSTICK: TOXINS IN OUR EVERYDAY BODY 
CARE AND HOW TO AVOID THEM (2011). 
 24. Kristof, supra note 11. Similar pieces of advice for pregnant women 
can be found lurking in the blogosphere. See, e.g., Attached Mama, Book To 
Help Reduce Toxin Exposure During Pregnancy, ECO BABY STEPS (July 26, 
2014), http://www.ecobabysteps.com/2014/07/26/book-to-help-reduce-toxin 
-exposure-during-pregnancy (“During your pregnancy, the developing fetus is 
far more vulnerable to toxins than you are as an adult. You are your baby’s 
protection, so protect your own environment to give your baby the best possi-
ble start.”). 
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from chemicals and pesticide proliferation can be self-managed 
and avoided through some self-determination and zeal. 
This sense of security, even for those who can afford it, is 
in the end a comforting but false fantasy. Individuals lack basic 
information required to understand risk of chronic, cumulative, 
and long-term toxic exposure in their daily lives. Even if indi-
viduals had complete information, most lack the expertise to 
assess the cumulative or synergistic risk from multiple sources. 
And even in the fantastical world where individuals could accu-
rately assess risk, chemicals proliferation has given way to an 
environment where some risks simply cannot be avoided. 
In the face of this broken landscape, it is time for a para-
digm shift—one where cumulative risk moves from regulatory 
fringe to center stage; one where legal frameworks directly ad-
dress cumulative risk and stop feeding the fallacy that labeling, 
information disclosure, or consumer choice can address the cen-
tral issues of the chemicals age. More specifically, regulatory 
safety standards need to consider the public health implica-
tions not from any single chemical but from the combination of 
multiple chemicals with common mechanisms of toxicity. It is 
the potential for combined and synergistic harm that needs at-
tention. In fact, so important is this need that the failure to 
systematize the considerations of cumulative risk may amount 
to “arbitrary and capricious” decision-making.25 
To be clear, there are ample guidelines and aspirational 
frameworks written by regulators to develop tools for cumula-
tive risk assessment. And there is great work being done by 
toxicologists to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of cu-
mulative risk assessment models. But without meaningful reg-
ulatory hooks, these tools will sit upon the shelf of good inten-
tions or buried in the drawer of difficult problems. This Article 
seeks to change that by showing why understanding cumula-
tive risk, though difficult, is necessary. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes how 
cumulative risk assessments tackle the real-world exposure 
problems that lie at the heart of public health. It shows how 
risk science has evolved and why policy, not science, lags be-
hind. Part II then examines why key public health concerns 
 
 25. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 
U.S. 29, 42–43 (1983) (suggesting that an agency’s decision is “arbitrary and 
capricious” if it fails to consider all the important factors). 
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cannot be answered through information disclosure or consum-
er choice models alone. 
Having established that regulatory drivers are needed, 
Part III begins to examine how to move forward. It does so by 
looking backward and examining how TSCA and FIFRA have 
failed historically to provide this critical public health focus de-
spite room in their statutory frameworks. It explores both theo-
retical and implementation gaps, showing how gaps in the legal 
frameworks are strikingly disconnected from the risk science 
literature. Importantly, understanding these gaps will provide 
critical insights for how to avoid similar pitfalls under the new-
ly enacted Chemical Safety Act. 
Finally, Part IV offers a path forward by suggesting where 
current regulatory frameworks could support a cumulative risk 
lens. In particular, Part IV considers how the existing safety 
standards under the newly reformed Chemicals Safety Act and 
FIFRA—both of which center on a threshold of “unreasonable 
risk”—can internalize issues of cumulative risk. In the end, it 
may well be that assessing cumulative risk is not only permis-
sible under the regulatory frameworks, but also indispensable 
to rational decision-making. 
Because TSCA has been recently amended, and because 
the EPA is required to develop new risk evaluation regulations 
to implement those amendments, the timing is right for adopt-
ing a fresh and deliberate approach to making a home for cu-
mulative risk in the future of chemicals legislation. In addition, 
the newfound attention on the chemicals legislation affords an 
opportunity to align the regulatory approaches under FIFRA 
and the reformed TSCA to redouble efforts to regulate on the 
basis of cumulative risk. To that end, this Article concludes by 
sketching a path forward and offering a home for cumulative 
risk under the existing regulatory framework. 
I.  THE POTENTIAL OF CUMULATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT   
Placing cumulative risk at the center regulatory frame-
work is key to protecting public health in the chemicals age. To 
appreciate why this is so, this Part examines how risk science 
is evolving to address issues of cumulative exposure; it explores 
the promise of cumulative risk assessments as well as the com-
plexities. Ultimately, this Part concludes that policy, not sci-
ence, has been the more substantial barrier to adopting a cu-
mulative risk lens to public health protection. 
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A. ASSESSING REAL WORLD EXPOSURES 
The U.S. EPA has conventionally approached risk assess-
ments by evaluating a single pollutant in a single exposure me-
dium.26 For example, the agency might evaluate the risks posed 
by DDT when inhaled through the air separately from the risks 
of DDT when ingested through drinking water. Risks posed by 
particulate matter when inhaled through the air would be yet 
another inquiry. The result is that population-level effects of 
additive or synergistic exposure to multiple pollutants through 
multiple channels (air, water, soil, consumer products, pesti-
cides) are not well-studied. In short, evaluating chemical safety 
under TSCA, or pesticide safety under FIFRA, is conducted 
product by product.27 
This ad hoc, piecemeal approach has downsides. Most no-
tably, single-stressor risk assessments do not reflect the real 
world, where hazards do not exist independently of one anoth-
er.28 Rather, in the real world, communities are simultaneously 
exposed to multiple stressors via multiple exposure pathways.29 
It is only by combining the knowledge of multiple stressors that 
one can begin to paint an accurate picture of pollutant loading 
that any given community faces over time. For example, a cu-
mulative risk assessment initiated in Baltimore evaluated 175 
chemicals emitted into the air from more than 125 facilities in 
an effort to identify effective prevention efforts to improve 
community health.30 
Scientists, regulators, and Congress have at various levels 
recognized the wisdom of adopting a cumulative risk lens. For 
its part, Congress recognized the importance of moving away 
from single-chemical, single-pathway risk assessment when it 
 
 26. The National Research Council’s original blueprint for risk assess-
ment, published in 1983, took this single-chemical approach. NAT’L RESEARCH 
COUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: MANAGING THE 
PROCESS 3 (1983), https://www.nap.edu/read/366. 
 27. EPA, FRAMEWORK, supra note 10, at 1 (“The focus of the EPA strategy 
to control pollution (and the risk assessment methodology being used to par-
tially support decisions) gradually leaned toward assessing and controlling the 
individual chemicals.”). 
 28. See, e.g., Gallagher et al., supra note 2, at 698 (“[P]opulations are ex-
posed simultaneously to multiple stressors via multiple exposure routes and 
pathways.”). 
 29. The EPA defines a “stressor” as “any physical, chemical, or biological 
entity that can induce an adverse response. A stressor may also be the lack of 
an essential entity, such as a habitat.” EPA, FRAMEWORK, supra note 10, at 
74. 
 30. See Gallagher et al., supra note 2, at 699 tbl.1 & 700–01. 
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adopted the Food Quality Protection Act (FQPA) in 1996.31 
While the FQPA is limited in scope and has been roundly criti-
cized in its implementation,32 it is one of the few examples 
where Congress has directly required some form of cumulative 
risk assessment for chemicals regulation. It is also a good ex-
ample of why regulatory drivers are needed to encourage the 
development and use of cumulative risk assessments. 
In the wake of the passage of FQPA there was a flurry of 
activity by regulators to study and develop tools for assessing 
risk from multiple stressors. This regulatory mandate, in com-
bination with a series of environmental justice lawsuits 
brought under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, prompted the 
EPA to develop cumulative risk models for broader applica-
tion.33 The EPA published the result of that work in the 
Framework for Cumulative Risk Assessment (Framework), 
which describes best practices for conducting cumulative risk 
assessments.34 
Though not binding,35 the Framework evidences the EPA’s 
recognition that cumulative risk assessments are important 
tools for advancing the public health goals of various environ-
mental laws: in the preface, the EPA announced that 
“[a]ssessing cumulative risk through complex exposures is one 
of the Agency’s high priorities” and is “germane and of great in-
terest to all program and regional offices.”36 A similar senti-
ment is reflected in the National Research Council’s 2009 Re-
port, which shifted away from a traditional single-chemical 
paradigm and warned that risk assessments are themselves at 
risk of becoming irrelevant unless they start accounting for 
 
 31. Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-170, 110 Stat. 
1489 (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 136–136y). 
 32. See, e.g., McGarity, supra note 6, at 147–202 (criticizing the imple-
mentation of certain FQPA provisions). 
 33. See EPA, FRAMEWORK, supra note 10, at x–xii (noting in several plac-
es the FQPA and its mandates related to cumulative risk assessment). 
 34. See id. at x (“[T]his framework is intended to identify the basic ele-
ments of the cumulative risk assessment process.”). 
 35. See id. at xvii (noting that the Framework “is neither a procedural 
guide nor a regulatory requirement within EPA, and it is expected to evolve 
with experience”); see also id. at xvii–xx (“Nothing in this report should be in-
terpreted as mandating that a cumulative risk assessment be conducted. . . . 
Rather, it is an information document.”). In fact, the Framework includes as-
pects of risk assessment that are “outside of the EPA’s current legislative 
mandates . . . .” Id. at xviii. The Framework is largely aspirational and “will 
serve as a foundation for developing future guidelines.” Id. at xvii. 
 36. Id. at xi. 
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cumulative impacts.37 The risk assessment literature also re-
flects a call by some academics and scientists to expand the use 
of cumulative risk assessments. As one epidemiologist ob-
served: 
[T]here is a growing mismatch between the broader, real-world ques-
tions being asked by decision makers and important stakeholders, 
and the narrow, limited answers provided by conventional risk as-
sessments. To rectify this situation, traditional chemical-by-chemical 
risk assessments must expand to incorporate consideration of com-
bined health effects from exposure to a diverse array of environmen-
tal agents such as people encounter during their normal daily rou-
tines.38 
To appreciate why assessing cumulative risk is key to ad-
dressing public health, it helps to begin with a detailed under-
standing of what cumulative risk assessment is and how it has 
been used. To that end, the Framework defines cumulative risk 
to mean “[t]he combined risks from aggregate exposures to 
multiple agents or stressors.”39 Several key features of cumula-
tive risk assessment are housed in this definition. 
First, cumulative risk assessments do not simply catalog 
descriptions of all the stressors and associated risks that im-
pact a defined population.40 Rather, cumulative risk assess-
 
 37. See also Gallagher et al., supra note 2, at 697 (“CRAs are meant to in-
crease the relevance of risk assessments, providing decision makers with in-
formation based on real world exposure scenarios that improve the characteri-
zation of actual risks and hazards.”). 
 38. Ken Sexton, Cumulative Risk Assessment: An Overview of Methodolog-
ical Approaches for Evaluating Combined Health Effects from Exposure to 
Multiple Environmental Stressors, 9 INT’L J. ENVTL. RES. & PUB. HEALTH 370, 
371 (2012) (citations omitted). 
39 39. EPA, FRAMEWORK, supra note 10, at 72. Stressors go beyond chemi-
cals—they can include low income, depressed community property values, lim-
ited access to healthcare, psychosocial stress, and other non-chemical stress-
ors. See Ari S. Lewis et al., Non-Chemical Stressors and Cumulative Risk 
Assessment: An Overview of Current Initiatives and Potential Air Pollutant In-
teractions, 8 INT’L J. ENVTL. RES. & PUB. HEALTH 2020, 2023 (2011). These 
nonchemical stressors are important to CRA initiated as part of environmen-
tal justice efforts. Examples of physical stressors include radiation, noise, vi-
bration, odor, temperature, and humidity. Id. at 2031. Biological stressors in-
clude pathogenic agents like bacterial or viral agents. Id. 
 40. See EPA, FRAMEWORK, supra note 10, at xvii–xx (“[A]n assessment 
that covers a number of chemicals or other stressors but that merely lists each 
chemical with a corresponding risk without consideration of the other chemi-
cals present is not an assessment of cumulative risk under this definition.”); 
see also id. at 47 (“Nonchemical stressors . . . can also interact with chemicals 
to change the risks either that would cause separately. For example, chemicals 
such as toluene can damage the auditory system and have been shown to po-
tentiate the effects of a physical stressor, noise, on hearing loss.”). 
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ments study how various stressors interact with one another 
and impact the given population when considered in combina-
tion. This means studying whether the impacts are additive or 
synergistic. Additive means determining which chemicals oper-
ate by similar modes of action—e.g., which ones are endocrine 
disruptors—and then determining whether the total risk can be 
calculated by adding up the individual risks posed by each of 
the chemicals over all identifiable exposure pathways.41 Syner-
gistic interactions are more complicated. Assessing synergistic 
interactions means determining whether two or more stressors 
combine such that the combination of stressors is worse than 
the impact of the individual stressors simply added together.42 
In some cases, the individual stressors may have no discernable 
effect except in combination with other stressors.43 
Second, stressors need not be chemical; they can also be 
physical, biological, or social.44 For example, assessing the risk 
of living near an airport would evaluate the impacts of air pol-
lution (chemical stressor) and noise (non-chemical stressor), 
both of which potentially affect hypertension.45 In addition, risk 
scientists recognize that “[s]tressful social environments may 
make a population that is already subject to chemical stressors 
even more sensitive to unhealthy environment exposures.”46 
Understanding how nonchemical stressors combine with chem-
 
 41. See id. at 8 (description of synergism). 
 42. See Ken Sexton & Dale Hattis, Assessing Cumulative Health Risks 
from Exposure to Environmental Mixtures—Three Fundamental Questions, 
115 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 825, 825 (2007) (explaining that “exposure to noise 
and toluene results in higher risk of hearing loss than from either stressor 
alone” and that “exposure to polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons and ultraviolet 
radiation increases toxicity to aquatic organisms”). 
 43. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, PESTICIDES IN THE DIETS OF INFANTS 
AND CHILDREN 342 (1993) (explaining that synergistic effects include situa-
tions where “two compounds, innocuous by themselves, might interact chemi-
cally even at low doses to form a new substance that is toxic”); see also Lewis 
et al., supra note 39, at 2038 (“A complication of defining the [mode of action] 
of non-chemical stressors (e.g. [socioeconomic status]) remains their lack of a 
biological link to disease, that is, [socioeconomic status] does not cause illness, 
but rather certain aspects associated with [socioeconomic status] appear to 
contribute to disease.”). 
 44. See EPA, FRAMEWORK, supra note 10, at xvii–xx. 
 45. Lewis et al., supra note 39, at 2033. 
 46. DEVON C. PAYNE-STURGES & LAWRENCE MARTIN, CUMULATIVE RISK 
WEBINAR SERIES: WHAT WE LEARNED 1 (2014), https://www.epa.gov/sites/ 
production/files/2015-10/documents/cra-webinar-summary.pdf (summarizing a 
series of webinars presented during 2012 and 2013 designed to “examine and 
stimulate discussion of topical issues important to advancing cumulative 
risk”). 
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ical stressors to impact vulnerable subpopulations is becoming 
a particularly important tool in the area of environmental jus-
tice advocacy.47 
Third, perhaps the most important conceptual feature of 
cumulative risk assessments is their focus on population-level 
analysis. This focus makes cumulative risk assessments useful 
to decision-makers who are wrestling with questions of public 
health or ecological health. In this way, a population-level risk 
analysis fits well with the public health mission of many envi-
ronmental statutes. For example, the Clean Air Act announces 
up front its purpose “to protect and enhance the quality of the 
Nation’s air resources so as to promote the public health and 
welfare.”48 This purpose stems from the congressionally stated 
finding that “the growth in the amount and complexity of air 
pollution brought about by urbanization, industrial develop-
ment, and the increasing use of motor vehicles, has resulted in 
mounting dangers to the public health and welfare.”49 The 
Clean Water Act, RCRA, and OSHA similarly declare broad 
public health purposes as the driving force for the legislation.50 
Even TSCA, despite its failings,51 is rooted in concerns about 
public health implications of chemicals proliferation. To that 
end, TSCA begins with the congressional finding that “human 
beings and the environment are being exposed each year to a 
large number of chemical substances and mixtures.”52 Certainly 
a risk assessment tool that considers the cumulative impact of 
these many chemicals is relevant to the core questions of risk 
and public safety. In fact, the EPA has similarly acknowledged 
the challenge of assessing the cumulative effects from chemi-
cals and pesticide proliferation: 
As of August 1, 2001, there were 19,533 pesticide products on the 
market and 79,120 existing chemicals on the Toxic Substance Control 
Act inventory. Each year, a number of chemicals are added. Assessing 
 
 47. See NAT’L ENVTL. JUST. ADVISORY COUNCIL, ENSURING RISK REDUC-
TION IN COMMUNITIES WITH MULTIPLE STRESSORS: ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 
AND CUMULATIVE RISKS/IMPACTS 1 (2004), https://www.epa.gov/sites/ 
production/files/2015-04/documents/ensuringriskreducationnejac.pdf. 
 48. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (2012). 
 49. Id. § 7401(a)(2). 
 50. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012); Resource Conserva-
tion and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a) (2012); Occupational Health and 
Safety Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (2012). 
 51. See supra note 6; see also Kristen Ekey, Note, Tick Toxic: The Failure 
To Clean up TSCA Poisons Public Health and Threatens Chemical Innovation, 
38 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 169, 169 (2013). 
 52. Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(1) (2012). 
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the cumulative effect of these chemicals will be a great challenge to 
the field of risk assessment and to the Agency.53 
Certainly a risk assessment tool that considers the cumulative 
impact of these chemicals is relevant to core questions of risk 
and public health.54 Not only is the tool relevant, but it is versa-
tile. Cumulative risk assessments can be used to address a va-
riety of public and ecological health issues at the national, re-
gional, or community level. They can be used to assess single 
exposure routes or multiple exposure routes. They can be used 
to study a single adverse outcome or understand relative risk 
between different health concerns (e.g., cancer, neurological, 
endocrinal). They can evaluate multiple exposure routes where 
the chemicals lead to similar adverse outcomes via different 
modes of action. They can even help assess chemical and 
nonchemical stressors that impact a more localized community 
and account for genetic vulnerabilities in certain subpopula-
tions.55 
The idea that cumulative risk is highly relevant to a broad 
range of public health concerns is reflected in several case stud-
ies that the EPA collected and commissioned during its devel-
opment of the Framework. These case studies highlight the 
current capability of performing cumulative risk assessments, 
demonstrating their usefulness in addressing a variety of pub-
lic and ecological health issues at the national, regional, or 
community level. 
In one nationwide study, the EPA examined the health ef-
fects from 177 hazardous air pollutants, including mixtures of 
pollutants.56 The study considered cancer risks and non-cancer 
hazards (e.g., respiratory or neurological effects). By relying on 
 
 53. EPA, FRAMEWORK, supra note 10, at xii (citations omitted). 
 54. See, e.g., Sexton, supra note 38 (“Over the past 35 years, the vast ma-
jority of risk assessments conducted by EPA have concentrated narrowly on 
individual chemical agents, distinct sources or source categories, and single 
exposure pathways, environmental media, routes of exposure, and health end-
points. It is becoming apparent, however, that a more holistic approach is nec-
essary if risk assessment is to remain a relevant and reliable decision-making 
tool.” (citations omitted)). 
 55. EPA, FRAMEWORK, supra note 10, at 41 (“Cumulative risk assess-
ments may be uniquely suited to addressing the issues related to vulnerabil-
ity.”) To address environmental justice concerns, some researchers have 
worked to develop cumulative risk assessment methodologies that incorporate 
nonchemical stressors into the overall understanding of health risks faced by 
certain vulnerable communities. See, e.g., Lewis et al., supra note 39, at 2020. 
 56. See Gallagher et al., supra note 2, at 702–03 (describing the National-
Scale Air Toxics Assessment (NATA)). 
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atmospheric dispersion models and human activity pattern da-
ta, the EPA was able to identify which pollutants and sources 
posed the greatest relative risk. Importantly, this study was 
able to draw on existing, facility-specific data sets that had 
been systematically collected though air-monitoring require-
ments routinely included in permits issued under Title V of the 
Clean Air Act.57 Studies like these can help the agency set regu-
latory priorities for reducing community exposures.58 Under-
standing cumulative risk for local communities can also be use-
ful when evaluating permitting decisions or facility siting 
proposals. 
While the air toxins studies demonstrate the use of cumu-
lative risk assessments on various spatial scales, and while 
they underscore the usefulness of having systematized data 
sets, they deal primarily with a single exposure route (namely 
inhalation). Real-world scenarios for chemical exposure from 
consumer products, by contrast, will likely require assessments 
that are sensitive to multiple exposure routes like dermal con-
tact, inhalation, and ingestion. Fortunately, other case studies 
focused on assessing risks from groups or classes of chemicals 
have undertaken this challenge. Those studies have developed 
methods for assessing combined impacts from multiple expo-
sure routes and for multiple chemicals leading to similar ad-
verse outcomes. 
For example, in response to regulatory requirements under 
the FQPA, the EPA studied the health risks posed by multiple 
pathways of exposure to the organophosphorus class of pesti-
cides (also known as “organophosphates” or “OPs”).59 These pes-
ticides operate through a common mode of action and lead to 
similar adverse outcomes. In particular, organophosphates 
cause a common neurotoxic effect—they all inhibit cholinester-
ase.60 Practically speaking, cholinesterase inhibition operates 
 
 57. Id. at 703 (discussing the Regional Air Impact Modeling Initiative 
(RAIMI) Pilot). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Examples of organophosphates include acephate, bensulide, DDVP, 
disulfoton, malathion, naled, Tetrachlorvinphos, and trichlorfon. See ENVTL. 
PROT. AGENCY, ORGANOPHOSPHORUS CUMULATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT 4 (2006), 
https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=EPA-HQ-OPP 
-2006-0618-0002&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf [hereinafter 
EPA, OP CRA]. 
 60. The EPA explains the process: 
OPs share the ability to bind to and phosphorylate the enzyme 
acetylcholinesterase in both the central (brain) and peripheral nerv-
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as a nerve gas—acute exposure can cause death and some stud-
ies have suggested that chronic, low-level exposure can cause 
neurological disorders such as ADHD.61 The EPA’s cumulative 
risk assessment studied the combined risk from multiple path-
ways including food, drinking water, and residential exposures. 
Because the EPA was examining risks from more than one 
chemical, and from more than one pathway, the EPA used the 
relative potency factor (RPF) method to determine the com-
bined risk associated with exposure to organophosphates. As 
explained by the EPA in its assessment: 
Briefly, the RPF approach uses an index chemical as the point of ref-
erence for comparing the toxicity of the OP pesticides. Relative poten-
cy factors (RPFs) are calculated as the ratio of the toxic potency of a 
given chemical to that of the index chemical. RPFs are used to convert 
exposures of all chemicals in the group into exposure equivalents of 
the index chemical.62 
 
ous systems. When acetylcholinesterase is inhibited, acetylcholine ac-
cumulates and cholinergic toxicity results due to continuous stimula-
tion of cholinergic receptors throughout the central and peripheral 
nervous systems which innervate virtually every organ in the body. 
Id. at 3. 
 61. For a popular account of acute and chronic risks of organophosphates, 
see Ker Than, Organophosphates: A Common but Deadly Pesticide, NAT’L GE-
OGRAPHIC (July 18, 2013), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2013/07/ 
130718-organophosphates-pesticides-indian-food-poisoning. For studies dis-
cussing impacts from chronic exposure, see Maryse F. Bouchard et al., Atten-
tion-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder and Urinary Metabolites of Organophos-
phate Pesticides, 125 PEDIATRICS e1270, e1270–71 (2010); Amy R. Marks et 
al., Organophosphate Pesticide Exposure and Attention in Young Mexican-
American Children: The CHAMACOS Study, 118 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 1768 
(2010) (examining Mexican-American children living in agricultural regions of 
California and concluding that prenatal and early childhood exposure to or-
ganophosphates can increase the risks of neurological disorders). 
 62. EPA, OP CRA, supra note 59. For the EPA’s cumulative risk assess-
ment for the class of pesticides known as organophosphates, the EPA chose 
methamidophos as the reference chemical and then determined the relative 
potency of other organophosphates with respect to methamidophos. For exam-
ple, malathion, an organophosphate used in mosquito control programs and 
sometimes found in lice-killing shampoo, was determined by EPA to be 0.0003 
as potent as methamidophos through oral exposure, 0.015 as potent through 
dermal exposure, and 0.003 as potent through inhalation. By calculating these 
relative potencies, over multiple exposure routes, the EPA can add exposure 
risks from a class of chemicals that are otherwise varied in their toxic poten-
tials. For a table of the relative potency factors, see id. at 51 tbl.I.B-5. Other 
similar methods have been used for assessing the impact of dioxin-like com-
pounds. In December 2010 the EPA published the results of a cumulative risk 
assessment that examined the health impacts from exposure to “dioxin-like 
compounds” found in multiple environmental media. DLCs include 2,3,7,8-
tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin (TCDD), polychlorinated dibenzo-p-dioxins 
(PCDDs), polychlorinated dibenzofurans (PCDFs), and polychlorinated bi-
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Because several chemicals were being assessed over multi-
ple exposure pathways, the EPA used behavioral and environ-
mental factors to develop a “probabilistic exposure assessment” 
in order to calculate the distribution of exposures from the var-
ious routes.63 In the end, the EPA was able to compare the haz-
ards posed from different pathways and identify specific organ-
ophosphates that posed the greatest hazard. In other words, 
the cumulative risk assessment allowed the EPA to assess 
overall safety from a class of compounds with similar mecha-
nisms of toxicity and use that assessment to set regulatory pri-
orities.64 
Recall that the OP study addressed impacts from multiple 
chemicals with a common mode of action. This means the 
chemicals cause a common toxic effect by operating through a 
similar “sequence of major biochemical events.”65 A slightly dif-
ferent and more complex problem is raised when chemicals lead 
to similar adverse outcomes (e.g., cancer) but operate via differ-
ent modes of action. The EPA tackled that issue in an evalua-
tion of risk due to disinfection byproducts in chlorinated drink-
ing water. In that instance there had been “[s]ome positive 
epidemiological and toxicological studies suggest[ing] reproduc-
tive and developmental effects and cancer are associated with 
consumption of chlorinated drinking water.”66 The study was 
designed to assess multiple exposure routes, including dermal, 
oral, and inhalation. Because the chemicals studied did not 
necessarily operate via the same mode of action, the study test-
ed the viability of a new method—the “cumulative relative po-
 
phenyls (PCBs). Having determined that these compounds were additive in 
their effect and operated through similar modes of toxicity, the EPA deter-
mined the toxic equivalency factor (TEF) for these compounds relative to 
TCDD. In doing so, the EPA would be able to determine the cumulative impact 
of these compounds when added together. The TEF methodology is appropri-
ate for compounds with additive toxicity. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, RECOM-
MENDED TOXICITY EQUIVALENCE FACTORS (TEFS) FOR HUMAN HEALTH RISK 
ASSESSMENTS OF 2,3,7,8-TETRACHLORODIBENZO-P-DIOXIN AND DIOXIN-LIKE 
COMPOUNDS (2010), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2013-09/ 
documents/tefs-for-dioxin-epa-00-r-10-005-final.pdf [hereinafter RECOMMEND-
ED TOXICITY]. 
 63. EPA, OP CRA, supra, note 58, at 9. 
 64. See Gallagher et al., supra note 2, at 702. 
 65. See EPA, OP CRA, supra note 59, at 3. 
 66. Linda K. Teuschler et al., A Feasibility Study of Cumulative Risk As-
sessment Methods for Drinking Water Disinfection By-Product Mixtures, 67 J. 
TOXICOLOGY & ENVTL. HEALTH 755, 755 (2004). 
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tency factor (CRPF) method”—to assess overall risk.67 These 
methods for addressing common adverse outcomes as opposed 
to common mechanisms of toxicity have paved the way for cu-
mulative risk assessments of chemicals like phthalates that are 
commonly found across a range of consumer products.68 
Together these examples demonstrate that the questions 
that cumulative risk assessments are meant to answer line up 
strikingly well with the real-world public health concerns that 
lie at the heart of chemicals and pesticide proliferation. This 
suggests a simple truth: if legislators and regulators are seri-
ous about addressing public health concerns, they need to move 
cumulative risk from the regulatory fringe and place it at the 
center of their efforts to set regulatory priorities. 
B. THE CHALLENGES OF CUMULATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT 
Given the natural fit between cumulative risk assessments 
and public health implications of chemicals and pesticide pro-
liferation, one might ask why cumulative risk assessments 
have not taken a more prominent role in driving regulatory de-
cisions. There are at least two reasons why cumulative risk as-
sessments exist largely at the regulatory fringe. The first rea-
son turns on technical and informational challenges to risk 
characterization. The second reason stems from the relatively 
few regulatory provisions that require risk management deci-
sions to turn on cumulative risk characterization. 
It is difficult to say which one of these challenges has to be 
tackled first—will the technical and informational gaps dimin-
ish if regulatory decision-making is required to turn on issues 
 
 67. The CRPF method is described by Teuschler et al.: 
The CRPF approach is a new method that combines the principles of 
dose addition and response addition into one method to assess mix-
tures risk for multiple route exposures. (Using two subclasses, Sets A 
and C, Figure 2 illustrates how the CRPF approach estimates risk 
from exposure to the mixture.) The CRPF approach uses information 
on MOA to assign chemicals to common MOA subclasses. These sub-
classes differ with respect to MOA, but the toxicological endpoint (or 
outcome) is the same. For each subclass, an index chemical (a mixture 
component with high-quality dose-response data that acts [or is 
judged to act] through the same MOA as the other members of the 
subclass for the effect and route of concern) is selected, and Index 
Chemical Equivalent Doses (ICED) are calculated using the relative 
potency factor (RPF) approach. 
Id. at 759 (citations omitted). As with the methods used to assess combined 
risk from organophosphates, the CRPF method makes the assumption of 
additivity. Id. 
 68. See infra Part I.B.1. 
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of cumulative risk? Or, would more regulatory drivers exist if 
cumulative risk assessments were easy to come by? To solve 
this chicken and egg problem, this Section examines the chal-
lenges to regulating cumulative risk. Ultimately, this Section 
concludes that a regulatory driver is necessary to making cu-
mulative risk assessments relevant to risk management deci-
sions. The technical challenges are complex but not insur-
mountable. Much progress has been made in developing 
methods, tools, and databases to facilitate cumulative risk 
characterization by regulators, communities, and professionals. 
For that work to translate into meaningful public health pro-
tection, however, a regulatory driver is needed. 
1. Complexity in Risk Characterization 
It is no secret that preparing a cumulative risk assessment 
is difficult.69 Risk characterization for multiple chemicals over 
multiple exposure pathways requires researchers to properly 
model and synthesize several data sets. This process can pose 
both technical challenges (e.g., developing models to match the 
complexity of real world scenarios) and informational challeng-
es (e.g., obtaining the information needed to run the models). 
Challenges include issues related to combining risk, fate and 
transport, timing of exposures, informational gaps, and com-
pounding uncertainty. 
a. Combining Risk 
Some of the difficulty in assessing cumulative risk comes 
from the technical challenges of not only evaluating the health 
impacts of individual stressors but also developing ways to add 
up the risk.70 To do this, researchers have to understand how 
chemicals interact in a mixture. In some situations, individual 
risks can be added to determine the joint risk. But in other sit-
uations, individual risks operate synergistically such that the 
sum is worse than the parts. Often the EPA will simplify the 
cumulative risk assessment by assuming additivity, because 
the understanding of synergistic interaction is still fairly unde-
veloped. In its cumulative risk assessment for organophosphate 
pesticides, for example, the EPA made a simplifying assump-
 
 69. EPA, FRAMEWORK, supra note 10, at 8 (explaining that assessing mul-
tiple-stressor cumulative risk is “considerably more complex methodologically 
and computationally than for . . . aggregate risk assessments or single-effect 
cumulative risk assessments”). 
 70. EPA, FRAMEWORK, supra note 10, at 2. 
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tion based on available data that doses from the studied pesti-
cides could be added once their relative toxicity was calculat-
ed.71 The EPA made this assumption while acknowledging “it is 
very difficult to prove dose additivity at human exposure levels” 
and “studies available on individual chemicals were usually not 
designed to address the issue of dose additivity.”72 The chal-
lenge of addressing synergistic interactions between chemicals 
was an issue that the EPA flagged in its 2003 Framework as 
well.73 
b. Fate and Transport 
Because the goal of cumulative risk assessments is ulti-
mately to model real-world exposure scenarios, understanding 
what happens to chemicals when released into the environment 
is an expected part of the assessment process. These “fate and 
transport” aspects of chemical assessment include considera-
tions of bioaccumulation and metabolites. Bioaccumulating 
chemicals do not metabolize; that is, they do not breakdown 
over time. Rather, they are stored in the fatty tissue of humans 
and animals and persist in the environment for a long time. 
Chemicals like PCBs and other dioxin-like compounds are no-
torious for their persistence in the environment and bioaccumu-
lation.74 This bioaccumulating behavior prompted the EPA to 
study the kind of cumulative risk model that would be appro-
priate for these dioxin-like compounds.75 Similarly, internation-
al regulatory agencies like Health Canada have identified bio-
accumulation as a point of uncertainty in evaluating 
cumulative risk from phthalates.76 Importantly, the bioaccu-
 
 71. EPA, OP CRA, supra note 59, at 135. 
 72. Id. 
 73. EPA, FRAMEWORK, supra note 10, at xii. 
 74. See, e.g., Angelika Beyer & Marek Biziuk, Environmental Fate and 
Global Distribution of Polychlorinated Biphenyls, 201 REV. ENVTL. CONTAMI-
NATION & TOXICOLOGY 137, 153 (2009) (“The intrinsic properties of PCBs, 
such as high environmental persistence, resistance to metabolism in organ-
isms, and tendency to accumulate in lipids have contributed to their ubiquity 
in environmental media and have induced concern for their toxic effects after 
prolonged exposure.”). 
 75. RECOMMENDED TOXICITY, supra note 62, at ii. 
 76. Health Canada acknowledged that “[a] lack of empirical data on bioac-
cumulation for some phthalates also presents some uncertainty in the esti-
mates of internal exposure concentrations.” HEALTH CAN. & ENV’T CAN., PRO-
POSED APPROACH FOR CUMULATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT OF CERTAIN 
PHTHALATES UNDER THE CHEMICALS MANAGEMENT PLAN 65 (2015), http:// 
www.ec.gc.ca/ese-ees/723C9007-1CBE-427D-BC20-755F25013B53/Approach_ 
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mulating nature of some chemicals means that the public 
health risks they pose can outlive their marketplace presence. 
For example, even though PCBs have long since been banned, 
they continue to impact ecological and human health.77 
The issues presented by metabolites are slightly different. 
Metabolites, or daughter products, are the chemical compounds 
that are formed when parent chemicals break down in the envi-
ronment. These metabolites can be significant potential sources 
of toxicity. In its organophosphates study, for example, the EPA 
acknowledged that once organophosphates are released into the 
environment they can transform into other chemicals called 
oxons and that those oxons “may be more toxic than the parent 
[organophosphate].”78 Similarly, when the EPA conducted a 
cumulative risk assessment for atrazine, a widely used and 
suspected endocrine-disrupting pesticide, the EPA also studied 
key metabolites. Notably, the metabolites are recognized as tox-
icologically equivalent to the commercially produced parent 
pesticide: “DEA, DIA, and DACT are all considered toxicologi-
cally equivalent (equipotent) to atrazine. All are key metabo-
lites that occur in drinking water and have been included in 
this cumulative risk assessment.”79 While at that time the EPA 
 
Phthalates%20(CRA)_EN.pdf. Phthalates are a class of chemicals used in 
many consumer products “that have been associated with effects on the devel-
opment of the reproductive system of male laboratory animals.” COMM. ON THE 
HEALTH RISKS OF PHTHALATES, NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, PHTHALATES AND CU-
MULATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT: THE TASK AHEAD (2008). The potential for expo-
sure from phthalates from multiple consumer products (including such as 
cosmetics, medical devices, children’s toys, and building materials) prompted 
the National Academy of Sciences to call for a cumulative risk assessment in 
2008. Id. 
 77. See WASH. DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, PUB. NO. 14-04-035, POLYCHLORINAT-
ED BIPHENYLS (PCBS) IN GENERAL CONSUMER PRODUCTS 2 (2014), https:// 
fortress.wa.gov/ecy/publications/documents/1404035.pdf (“Current levels of 
PCBs in Washington stem from cycling of PCBs in the environment, continu-
ing releases from historic uses, and releases of newly generated PCBs [as by-
products].”); Beyer & Biziuk, supra note 74, at 137. 
 78. EPA, OP CRA, supra note 59, at 11. 
 79. HEALTH EFFECTS DIV., OFFICE PESTICIDE PROGRAMS, U.S. ENVTL. 
PROT. AGENCY, CUMULATIVE RISK FROM TRIAZINE PESTICIDES 32 (2006), 
http://oehha.ca.gov/media/downloads/crnr/triazinecumulativerisk2006.pdf. 
Based on that cumulative risk assessment, the EPA concluded that “there is a 
reasonable certainty that no harm will result to the general U.S. population, 
infants, children, or other major identifiable subgroups of consumers from ag-
gregate exposure (from food, drinking water, and non-occupational sources) to 
cumulative residues of atrazine and the other chlorinated triazine pesticides.” 
Memorandum from Diane Sherman et al., Chem. Review Manager, Office of 
Pesticide Programs, to Robert McNally et al., Branch Chief, Office of Pesticide 
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concluded that atrazine exposure met federal safety standards, 
the EPA has recently published a refined ecological risk as-
sessment that concludes atrazine poses significant ecological 
risk for “mammals, birds, reptiles, plants and plant communi-
ties across the country.”80 That assessment reiterates that some 
of atrazine’s metabolites are of “equal potency” to atrazine.81 
c. Timing of Exposures 
In addition to fate and transport issues, assessing cumula-
tive risk is made more complicated by the time-related aspects 
of exposure. As the EPA explained in its Framework: “Because 
some chemicals may have the ability to affect an organism’s re-
sponse to other chemicals, consideration of the time sequence of 
exposure may take on an additional layer of complexity in mul-
tiple-chemical cumulative risk assessments.”82 In other words, 
timing of exposures to various chemicals may matter because 
exposure to one chemical may make an individual or communi-
ty more susceptible to a later in time exposure to a second 
chemical. In single stressor assessments, by contrast, the tim-
ing of doses relative to one another is less important (although 
it may be important to consider timing relative to childhood de-
velopmental stages). 
d. Information Gaps and Compounding Uncertainties 
In addition to the technical challenges that experts face in 
developing theoretical models to reflect real-world exposure 
scenarios, there is one more obstacle to contend with: informa-
tional challenges. Even if researchers are confident in the theo-
retical models—e.g., choosing additive interactions over syner-
gistic—the confidence in the ultimate assessment will be a 
function of the quality of the data inputs to the theoretical 
models. To that end, risk assessments require not just 
knowledge of chemical behavior (e.g., mode of action, whether 
 
Programs 2 (Apr. 6, 2006), https://archive.epa.gov/pesticides/reregistration/ 
web/pdf/atrazine_combined_docs.pdf. 
 80. FRANK T. FARRUGIA ET AL., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REFINED 
ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT FOR ATRAZINE 2 (2016), http:// 
chicagotonight.wttw.com/sites/default/files/article/file-attachments/EPA-HQ 
-OPP-2013-0266-0315.pdf. 
 81. Id. at 23 (“Atrazine, simazine, propazine, and the 3 chlorinated 
degradates common to these compounds all exhibit neuroendocrine effects 
seen across mammals and can alter hormone levels in rats that may result in 
developmental and reproductive consequences.”). 
 82. EPA, FRAMEWORK, supra note 10, at 37. 
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interactions are additive) but also an understanding of dose to 
the average member of a population (e.g., exposure pathways, 
how frequently people are exposed, concentrations at which ex-
posed).83 
Characterizing the dose-response relationship often re-
quires researchers to make certain assumptions about human 
activity. It also requires understanding how chemical concen-
trations in the environment or in consumer products translate 
into doses. The national-scale air toxic assessment, for exam-
ple, used atmospheric deposition models and human activity 
pattern data to estimate the frequency, duration, and magni-
tude of exposure.84 In another, more regionally focused air tox-
ics study, the EPA used air emissions data from federal and 
state regulatory databases and permit applications to estimate 
risks on the neighborhood level.85 Similarly, to understand ex-
posure probabilities, the researchers in the water study used 
data regarding concentrations of disinfection byproducts in wa-
ter as well as human activity and water use patterns.86 To get a 
sense of the assumptions involved, consider that the estima-
tions of human patterns in the National Air Toxics Assessment 
were complicated by the fact that people move around from lo-
cation to location, which may have differing air quality.87 Also, 
people breathe at different rates depending on activity levels. 
“For these reasons, the average concentration of a pollutant 
that people breathe (i.e., exposure concentration) may be signif-
icantly higher or lower than the concentration at a fixed loca-
tion (i.e., ambient concentration).”88 
Though complex, these case studies demonstrate that 
quantifying risks through cumulative risk assessments is more 
feasible when regulatory frameworks like the Clean Air Act or 
the Safe Drinking Water Act systematize the collection of data 
regarding chemical concentrations in the environment (e.g., air 
emissions data or water concentration data). When exposure 
results from chemicals contained in multiple consumer prod-
 
 83. Id. at 38 (“Estimating exposure is a key step in determining potential 
health risk.”). 
 84. Gallagher et al., supra note 28, at 703. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 702. 
 87. Id. at 58. 
 88. See Overview: The 4 Steps, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https:// 
archive.epa.gov/airtoxics/nata/web/html/4steps.html (last updated Feb. 21, 
2016). 
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ucts, informational challenges may be more substantial be-
cause there may be additional uncertainty regarding how con-
tact with a chemical translates into dose. For example, how 
much of the PFOA in Teflon-coated cookware makes its way in-
to a given person’s body when that person uses the cookware on 
average ten times per week? Or how much of the BPA from a 
water bottle leaches in the water that an individual then 
drinks? 
In order to fully appreciate the informational challenges 
that confront cumulative risk assessments, consider that cumu-
lative risk assessments require the same knowledge as other-
wise needed for single stressor risk assessments, and then 
some.89 This means that whatever data gap issues plague a 
regulator’s understanding of individual chemicals are not 
avoided, but potentially compounded, in cumulative risk as-
sessments.90 The information gap for chemicals has been well 
documented.91 If cumulative risk assessments were to take a 
 
 89. See EPA, FRAMEWORK, supra note 10, at 44 (discussing how single 
stressor studies can “provide informative qualitative information for 
multistressor assessments” but that “further consideration” is needed before 
exposure assessments for single stressors can be used in cumulative risk as-
sessments). 
 90. Id. at 32 (“Large data gaps make risk and hazard assessment of envi-
ronmentally relevant chemical exposures highly uncertain even for single 
agents. Expanded assessments that address cumulative risk considerations 
(e.g. mixtures, developmental toxicity, nonchemical agents) are a better match 
for real-world circumstances but require acknowledgement of even more un-
certainty.”); see also id. at 36 (explaining that information challenges are even 
greater for nonchemical stressors). 
 91. For a detailed discussion of the profound information gap that plagues 
toxic chemicals, see Wagner, supra note 19, at 1619 (“One of the most signifi-
cant problems facing environmental law is the dearth of scientific information 
available to assess the impact of industrial activities on public health and the 
environment.”). Similar observations have been made in the cumulative risk 
assessment literature. See EPA, FRAMEWORK, supra note 10, at 47 (“Toxicity 
and interaction data that cover the full range of exposures for the exposure-
response relationship for mixture of interest is usually impossible to obtain 
because of limits on budgets and other resources.”); see also Sarah Alves et al., 
U.S. EPA Authority To Use Cumulative Risk Assessments in Environmental 
Decision-Making, 9 INT’L J. ENVTL. RES. & PUB. HEALTH 1997, 2001 (2012) 
(“[I]n real life, information is usually limited on one or more of these key data 
needed for risk assessment calculations.” (quoting Risk Assessment: About 
Risk Assessment, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/ 
risk/about-risk-assessment (last visited Apr. 24, 2017))); Ken Sexton & Dale 
Hattis, Assessing Cumulative Health Risks from Exposure to Environmental 
Mixtures—Three Fundamental Questions, 115 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPS. 825, 
825 (2007) (“Although there is an expanding body of work on cumulative expo-
sures and combined effects on people . . . adequate and appropriate data are 
rarely available to conduct a rigorous assessment of cumulative risk.”). 
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more prominent role in the regulation of chemicals and pesti-
cides, the informational problems that exist today would need 
to be addressed before substantial progress could be made for 
cumulative risk assessments. In the meantime, for some cumu-
lative risk assessments, qualitative analysis may need to sub-
stitute for quantification if the data sets are not available. 
Taken together, these individual technical and informa-
tional challenges may result in one of the most difficult political 
challenges standing between cumulative risk assessments and 
their more widespread use in risk management decisions. That 
is, at each step along the way—assessing individual risk, de-
termining the mechanism for adding together the risk, deciding 
how to treat the timing of exposures, identifying vulnerabilities 
from nonchemical or genetic stressors, accounting for metabo-
lites, relying on qualitative assessments when data is unavail-
able—uncertainty is introduced to the overall assessment. 
Notably, uncertainty need not be a bar to regulation. To 
supplement the federal regime, California adopted legislation 
to address chemicals regulation.92 In addition to imposing a dis-
closure requirement, Proposition 65 prohibits businesses from 
discharging toxic chemicals into drinking water supplies.93 Be-
cause liability turns on specified risk levels, the statute con-
tains a number of provisions addressing how risk from chemi-
cals exposure ought to be calculated.94 To account for 
uncertainty in assessing cumulative risk, for example, Proposi-
tion 65 makes conservative assumptions, e.g., setting the expo-
sure level for reproductive toxicants at one thousand times the 
actual exposure level.95 
 
 92. Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986, CAL. HCS 
CODE §§ 25249.5–26217 (2016). 
 93. Id. § 25249.5. 
 94. Michael W. Graf, Regulating Pesticide Pollution in California Under 
the 1986 Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Exposure Act (Proposition 65), 28 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 663, 671–73 (2001). 
 95. Id. at 673. As Michael Graf has explained:  
Proposition 65 assumes a lifetime exposure at the level of chemical 
concentration in the relevant environmental medium (such as air or 
water). For reproductive toxicants, which may pose an acute risk de-
pendent on the amount of a single dose, Proposition 65 assumes an 
exposure at one thousand (1,000) times the actual exposure level. The-
se conservative statutory assumptions assure that discharges or ex-
posures are assessed in a preventative manner, in effect taking into 
account—albeit in an approximate fashion—the cumulative effect of 
the different sources of toxic chemicals to which persons will be ex-
posed. 
Id. 
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While uncertainty in risk assessment is not a bar to regu-
lation, and while even the act of asking cumulative risk ques-
tions advances public health missions, uncertainty does open 
up regulators to delay through litigation challenges and rule-
making ossification. Ultimately, the appetite for regulating in 
the face of uncertainty, both from regulators and legislators, 
will have much influence over how useful cumulative risk as-
sessments can ultimately be in risk management decisions. 
 Part IV will take up the discussion of how legal frame-
works can be structured to protect public health in the face of 
uncertainties in cumulative risk assessment. In particular, 
regulating on the basis of cumulative risk would require statu-
tory frameworks that anticipate uncertainty and reflect a pre-
cautionary approach to chemicals or pesticide proliferation, ei-
ther by shifting the burden of proving safety to firms or crafting 
safety standards that allow regulation when cumulative risks 
“may” be unreasonable to public health. 
2. The Need for a Regulatory Driver 
So far, an examination of the promise and challenges of 
cumulative risk assessment appears to present a dilemma of 
sorts: on the one hand, assessing cumulative risk is highly rele-
vant to answering key questions about public health; on the 
other hand, it is difficult. As it turns out, however, the fact that 
cumulative risk assessments are complex does not justify keep-
ing them on the regulatory fringe. It may well be true that the 
science could not support a regulatory focus on cumulative risk 
assessment in the 1970s and 1980s, when many environmental 
statutes were adopted. That is no longer true. 
Today, agency scientists, academics, and professionals are 
devoting resources to develop better methods and tools for un-
dertaking cumulative risk assessments.96 Most notably, the 
U.S. EPA has initiated a research program called the Cumula-
tive Communities Research Program.97 This program develops 
 
 96. See generally Valerie G. Zartarian & Bradley D. Schultz, The EPA’s 
Human Exposure Research Program for Assessing Cumulative Risk in Com-
munities, 20 J. EXPOSURE SCI. & ENVTL. EPIDEMIOLOGY 351 (2010) (describing 
various tools being developed to facilitate cumulative risk assessments). 
 97. See Timothy M. Barzyk et al., Tools Available to Communities for 
Conducting Cumulative Exposure and Risk Assessments, 20 J. EXPOSURE SCI. 
& ENVTL. EPIDEMIOLOGY 371 (2010); Myriam Medina-Vera et al., An Overview 
of Measurement Method Tools Available to Communities Conducting Exposure 
and Cumulative Risk Assessment, 20 J. EXPOSURE SCI. & ENVTL. EPIDEMIOL-
OGY 359 (2010). A companion program—the EPA Community Action for a Re-
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a broad range of tools, including fact sheets, web portals, expo-
sure models, databases, and sampling methods to advance cu-
mulative risk science.98 For example, several web-based GIS 
mapping tools to help regulators, communities, and profession-
als identify locations of regulated facilities, brownfields, super-
fund sites, waste management facilities, and more.99 One web-
site was developed by federal, state and tribal agencies to 
provide access to national air quality information.100 In addition 
to mapping tools, the EPA has developed several informational 
databases on everything from chemical toxicity data to national 
radiation data, to water pollutant discharge data, to hazardous 
air pollutant data.101 Many of these tools and databases are 
publicly available. 
There are also guidance documents available on a variety 
of topics meant to advance community understanding of public 
health and environmental risk. For example, there are docu-
ments providing advice on how to reduce asbestos exposure, 
how to identify sources of outdoor air pollution, how to apply 
principles of risk assessment to air toxins, how to become in-
volved in the superfund assessment process. More specific to 
cumulative risk assessments, the EPA has published frame-
works for ecological risk assessment, risk assessment guide-
lines on chemical mixtures and developmental toxicity, and 
guidance documents on issues like cumulative risk planning 
and scoping.102 
Not least, the EPA has devoted resources to developing ex-
posure models for cumulative risk.103 One model is aimed specif-
ically at quantifying the “potential inhalation, dermal and in-
gestion dose rates resulting from chemicals released from 
 
newed Environment (CARE)—provides funding and technical assistance to 
community groups to address concerns related to public health risks. Id. In 
addition to the CARE program, the EPA’s National Center for Environmental 
Research (NCER) is also funding research “to develop methods and strategies 
for assessing the combined effects of chemical, physical, biological and social 
stressors while factoring in population vulnerabilities.” PAYNE-STURGES & 
MARTIN, supra note 46. 
 98. See Barzyk, supra note 97, at 372. 
 99. Id. at 373. 
 100. Id. at 374. 
 101. Id. at 380. 
 102. EPA, FRAMEWORK, supra note 10, at 5 (providing table of guidelines 
and guidance documents published by the EPA to advance cumulative risk 
science). 
 103. Barzyk, supra note 97. 
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consumer products.”104 Another examines dietary exposure to 
pesticide through chemical residues on food. The models can 
get fairly specific—like modeling exposure to wood preserva-
tives from outdoor playgrounds. Some models even tackle the 
time-related aspects of cumulative risk modeling.105 Other tools 
address population vulnerability and nonchemical stressors.106 
Still others look at child-specific issues of aggregate exposure.107 
Notably, states like California are breaking ground on these is-
sues as well. To that end, the California Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (Cal. EPA) has been a trailblazer in efforts to de-
velop a screening method to identify and rank communities 
that are most affected by cumulative risk from chemical and 
nonchemical stressors.108 
With advances in research on biomarkers, nonchemical 
stressors, genomics, and data analysis, there are many tools, 
models and databases available for cumulative risk analysis. 
Together this body of research may inspire an optimist to ob-
serve that technical and informational challenges to cumulative 
risk assessment, while difficult, are increasingly solvable. And 
given the evolutions in science to provide better tools for as-
sessing cumulative risk, one might expect cumulative risk as-
 
 104. E-FAST-Exposure and Fate Assessment Screening Tool Version 2014, 
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/tsca-screening-tools/e-fast 
-exposure-and-fate-assessment-screening-tool-version-2014 (last visited Apr. 
24, 2017). 
 105. EPA, FRAMEWORK, supra note 10, at 40. 
 106. See PAYNE-STURGES & MARTIN, supra note 46, at 2 (discussing in gen-
eralities the Cumulative Environmental Vulnerability Analysis (CEVA) and 
the California EPA’s CalEnviroScreen models). See generally Teresa Chahine 
et al., Modeling Joint Exposures and Health Outcomes for Cumulative Risk 
Assessment: The Case of Radon and Smoking, 8 INT’L J. ENVTL. RES. & PUB. 
HEALTH 3688 (2011) (examining residential radon levels to make generaliza-
tions about chemical and non-chemical stressors). 
 107. See generally Paloma I. Beamer, Relative Pesticide and Exposure 
Route Contribution to Aggregate and Cumulative Dose in Young Farmworker 
Children, 9 INT’L J. ENVTL. RES. & PUB. HEALTH 73 (2012) (utilizing the Child-
Specific Aggregate Cumulative Human Exposure and Dose framework to 
quantify exposure in young farmworker children). 
 108. Laura Meehan August, Methodological Considerations in Screening 
for Cumulative Environmental Health Impacts: Lessons Learned from a Pilot 
Study in California, 9 INT’L J. ENVTL. RES. PUB. HEALTH 3069, 3070 (2012); 
Ganlin Huang & Jonathan K. London, Cumulative Environmental Vulnerabil-
ity and Environmental Justice in California’s San Joaquin Valley, 9 INT’L J. 
ENVTL. RES. PUB. HEALTH 1593, 1594 (2012); James L. Sadd, Playing It Safe: 
Assessing Cumulative Impact and Social Vulnerability Through an Environ-
mental Justice Screening Method in the South Coast Air Basin, California, 8 
INT’L J. ENVTL. RES. PUB. HEALTH 1441, 1454–56 (2011). 
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sessment to have become more of a driver in environmental and 
public health regulation. This has not been the case. 
Despite progress on the technical side, and with the possi-
ble exception of state-led efforts in California, risk assessment 
practice has “lagged behind the science.”109 Within EPA pro-
gram offices, there is no agency-wide policy for considering cu-
mulative risks when making environmental decisions.110 To be 
sure, there have been statements of support, urging the im-
portance of cumulative risk assessments. There have also been 
guidance documents in support of efforts to assess cumulative 
risk. And yet, cumulative risk assessments exist largely in the 
context of voluntary and informational measures. The EPA’s 
framework on cumulative risk assessment is “[n]either a proce-
dural guide nor a regulatory requirement.”111 The risk assess-
ment literature more often speaks in terms of developing tools 
to “empower communities with information” than to meet regu-
latory requirements.112 To that end, the EPA developed a web-
based tool, the Community-Focused Exposure and Risk Screen-
ing Tool (C-FERST), which is meant to be a “one-stop shopping 
tool” that makes exposure models, information databases, and 
guidance documents available in the same place.113 
Of course, no part of this critique is meant to suggest that 
community empowerment is ill-advised. Rather this serves to 
highlight the fact that regulatory frameworks are not featured 
prominently as the endpoint for risk characterization efforts. 
Indeed, there is a separation between risk assessment efforts 
 
 109. Margaret M. MacDonell et al., Cumulative Risk Assessment Toolbox: 
Methods and Approaches for the Practitioner, J. TOXICOLOGY, 2013, at 1, 2 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2013/310904 (“Despite the increase in relevant anal-
yses and reports, the translation of a more fully integrated approach to prac-
tice has lagged behind the science. With various groups and individual com-
munity members unaware of available tools that could be used to assess 
cumulative risk, explicit applications have been relatively modest.”). 
 110. Alves, supra note 91, at 1997; see also id. (“Some EPA offices make 
decisions as if they do not have the authority to use cumulative risk assess-
ments.”). 
 111. MacDonell, supra note 109. 
 112. Zartarian & Schultz, supra note 96, at 357; see also Barzyk, supra 
note 97 (“Community-based risk assessments have been gaining momentum 
as community groups become involved in identifying, prioritizing, and mitigat-
ing their environmental concerns.”). 
 113. Pamela R.D. Williams et al., Cumulative Risk Assessment (CRA): 
Transforming the Way We Assess Health Risks, 46 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 10868, 
10871 (2012), http://pub.acs.org/doi/abs/10.1021/es3025353 (describing C-
FERST as a “flagship tool”). 
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and risk management decisions.114 The Center for Disease Con-
trol (CDC) has been conducting a series of biomonitoring stud-
ies since 1999, whereby the CDC measures various chemicals 
in people’s blood and urine to assess the levels of chemical ab-
sorption across the general population.115 The results of these 
CDC assessments highlight that while individual products or 
chemicals might not raise safety concerns, the collective expo-
sure may be quite alarming. And yet, the CDC reports are in-
formational only; they do not provide regulatory recommenda-
tions.116 Similarly, some cumulative risk assessments 
undertaken by the EPA, like the dioxin assessment, emphasize 
that the work is not binding. 
Ultimately these observations point to a simple assertion: 
for cumulative risk assessment to move from regulatory fringe, 
there need to be regulatory drivers. The problem with taking a 
cumulative risk focus to public health regulation is not a barri-
er of science, but policy. In fact, while the science has evolved, 
the legal frameworks have remained stagnant. The Food Quali-
ty Protection Act (FQPA) is one of the few examples of a regula-
tory command that puts issues of cumulative risk at the center 
of public health standards.117 Not surprisingly, much of the re-
cent work that has been done on cumulative risks of chemicals 
or pesticides has cited the FQPA mandates as the impetus for 
that work.118 Outside of limited legal contexts, however, cumu-
lative risk assessments have assumed only an ad hoc, informa-
tional role. In fact, relative to the number of questions that 
regularly emerge regarding exposure to chemicals in all aspects 
 
 114. P. Calow & V.E. Forbes, Making the Relationship Between Risk As-
sessment and Risk Management More Intimate, 47 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 8095, 
8096 (2013). 
 115. See U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. & CTR. FOR DISEASE CON-
TROL, FOURTH NATIONAL REPORT ON HUMAN EXPOSURE TO ENVIRONMENTAL 
CHEMICALS 1 (2009), https://www.cdc.gov/exposurereport/pdf/fourthreport.pdf. 
The CDC released its Fourth National Report on Human Exposure to Envi-
ronmental Chemicals in 2009 and provided updates to its tables in 2015. See 
generally U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. & CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, 
FOURTH NATIONAL REPORT ON HUMAN EXPOSURE TO ENVIRONMENTAL CHEM-
ICALS, UPDATED TABLES (2015), https://www.cdc.gov/biomonitoring/pdf/ 
FourthReport_UpdatedTables_Feb2015.pdf. 
 116. See National Report on Human Exposure to Environmental Chemicals: 
Frequently Asked Questions, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, https://www.cdc 
.gov/exposurereport/faq.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2017). 
 117. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FRAMEWORK FOR CUMULATIVE RISK 
ASSESSMENT app. E (2003). 
 118. See, e.g., Beamer, supra note 107, at 73. 
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of daily life, very little work has been done to find answers from 
a cumulative risk perspective. And when that work has been 
done, it does not always have an obvious or prominent home in 
the risk management decisions. 
II.  THE NECESSITY OF REGULATING CUMULATIVE 
RISK   
So far, this Article has examined why cumulative risk as-
sessments are a good fit for addressing population-level risks 
posed by chemicals and pesticide proliferation. To understand 
why regulating cumulative risk is not just a good idea but also 
necessary to protecting public health, consider the alternative: 
when regulatory frameworks ignore issues of cumulative risk, 
or when chemicals and pesticide regulations are weak, individ-
uals are left to assess and manage their own risk from count-
less consumer products and environmental sources. 
This is precisely the situation that existing legal frame-
works have created. In fact, an important backdrop to the story 
of failed chemicals regulation in the United States may be the 
promotion of the idea that individual consumers are the mas-
ters of their own fate. For example, there is no shortage of help-
ful hints from the blogosphere, books, news articles, or NGOs 
on how to protect ourselves in a world laced with chemicals. In 
one article, the Washington Post provides tips for avoiding toxic 
bisphenol-S, which is the chemical sometimes used to replace 
the controversial bisphenol-A in BPA-free products.119 Among 
the long list of items to avoid, we find “tissue paper and toilet 
paper.”120 From the reporters at CNN we are told to avoid 
shampoo with fragrances.121 From the Environmental Working 
Group we are told to buy organic whenever possible.122 Of 
 
 119. Amy Ellis Nutt, How To Avoid Products with Toxic Biphenol-S, WASH. 
POST (Jan. 13, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-your-health/ 
wp/2015/01/13/how-to-avoid-products-with-toxic-bisphenol-s. Also on the list 
are hard plastic sports bottles, plastic food storage containers, food wrap, hard 
and flexible packaging, deli containers, plastic bags, baby bottle components 
(nipple, ring, liner, etc.), plastic dinnerware and plates, non-stick cookware, 
plastic cleaning products, thermal receipt paper, and canned foods and drinks. 
Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. See Martin, supra note 11. 
 122. Frequently Asked Questions About Produce and Pesticides: Should We 
Eat More Fruits and Vegetables? What About Pesticide Residues?, ENVTL. 
WORKING GROUP, https://www.ewg.org/foodnews/faq.php#question_8 (last vis-
ited Apr. 24, 2017). 
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course this helpful advice usually comes with the caveat that “it 
is nearly impossible to not be exposed to plastic in the course of 
a day.”123 
When the problems of chemicals and pesticide proliferation 
are viewed from a public health lens, it may seem obvious to 
some that individuals cannot manage the fallout on their 
own.124 At the same time, disclosure regulation has found trac-
tion in many areas of regulatory decision-making and certainly 
has appeal from a freedom of choice perspective. Some reflec-
tion on the scholarly discourse surrounding disclosure regula-
tion is, therefore, warranted. To that end, this Part begins by 
considering the general support for and criticisms of disclosure 
as a regulatory tool. After surveying the existing discourse 
rules, this Part goes on to explain why, when viewed with an 
appreciation for cumulative risk, disclosure is a nonsensical 
approach to chemicals and pesticide regulation. In the end, the 
inability of individuals to manage their own risk from the mul-
titude of chemical and pesticides that are encountered in daily 
life is not just an argument against relying on information dis-
closure; it is an argument for directly addressing public health 
concerns by regulating cumulative risk. 
A. DISCLOSURE REGULATION AS A GOVERNANCE TOOL 
Disclosure regulation relies on the dissemination of infor-
mation to the public as a means of facilitating consumer choice 
and ultimately allowing public pressure to encourage self-
regulatory corporate behavior. This governance tool has deep 
and wide roots in American regulatory regimes.125 In what Pro-
 
 123. Nutt, supra note 119. 
 124. Non-experts would understandably have difficulty sorting out conflict-
ing scientific reports and counter-narratives from industry groups. See David 
Heath, Contesting the Science of Smoking, THE ATLANTIC (May 4, 2016), http:// 
www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/05/low-tar-cigarettes/481116 (com-
paring the strategies used by the chemicals industry with those used by tobac-
co industry in manufacturing doubt with respect to health data). See generally 
NAOMI ORESKES & ERIK CONWAY, MERCHANTS OF DOUBT: HOW A HANDFUL OF 
SCIENTISTS OBSCURED THE TRUTH ON ISSUES FROM TOBACCO SMOKE TO 
GLOBAL WARMING (2010); MERCHANTS OF DOUBT, http://www 
.merchantsofdoubt.org (last visited Apr. 24, 2017) (“The troubling story of how 
a cadre of influential scientists have clouded public understanding of scientific 
facts to advance a political and economic agenda.”). 
 125. Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Stand-
ing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 619 (1999) (“[M]any statutes 
and regulations now require the disclosure or even the production of infor-
mation.”). 
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fessors Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl Schnieder have since called 
the “Disclosure Empire,”126 information disclosure requirements 
have played a role in myriad legal frameworks from financial 
regulations to fuel efficiency standards, and pension plans to 
college promotional brochures.127 Professor Cass Sunstein has 
likewise observed that “[t]raditionally, information production 
and disclosure have been considered an appropriate regulatory 
response to market failures that stem from asymmetric or in-
adequate information.”128 
The idea that government should reduce regulatory bur-
dens and encourage freedom of choice for the public has also 
found traction in Executive Order 13563, issued by the Obama 
administration: “Where relevant, feasible, and consistent with 
regulatory objectives, and to the extent permitted by law, each 
agency shall identify and consider regulatory approaches that 
reduce burdens and maintain flexibility and freedom of choice 
for the public.”129 
Among legal scholars, the support for information disclo-
sure runs the gamut from using disclosure as a complement to 
substantive regulation to relying on disclosure as a substitute 
for substantive regulation. Professor Cass Sunstein argues 
“from the standpoint of efficiency, information remedies can be 
better than either command-and-control regulation or reliance 
on unregulated markets alone.”130 The information, he explains, 
allows citizens to oversee and assess government regulation. In 
this way, “[a] well-functioning system of deliberative democracy 
requires a certain degree of information.”131 Similarly, Profes-
sors Kip Viscusi and Ted Gayer have advocated disclosure laws 
 
 126. Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Dis-
closure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 665 (2011) (“The great paradox of the Disclo-
sure Empire is that even as it grows, so also grows the evidence that mandat-
ed disclosure repeatedly fails to accomplish its ends.”). 
 127. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1349, 1366–67 (2011); see also Jacob Alderice, The Informed Stu-
dent-Consumer: Regulating For-Profit Colleges by Disclosure, 50 HARV. C.R.–
C.L. L. REV. 215, 247 (2015) (discussing the role of information disclosure in 
the regulation of for-profit colleges); Lauren E. Willis, When Nudges Fail: 
Slippery Defaults, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1155, 1224 (2013). 
 128. Sunstein, supra note 127 (describing the various areas in which dis-
closure regulation has been used). 
 129. Exec. Order No. 13563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821, 3822 (Jan. 21, 2011); see 
also id. at 3821 (including information disclosure as one an example of an ap-
propriate regulatory tool). 
 130. Sunstein, supra note 125, at 625. 
 131. Id. 
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as a cost effective regulatory approach that respects the differ-
ent risk tolerances among various individuals: “hazard warn-
ings potentially can work through the market by providing con-
sumers and workers with needed information” and 
“permit[ting] people to make choices consistent with their own 
risk-cost balancing rather than being subject to uniform regula-
tory standards that almost invariably fail to recognize such dif-
ferences in individuals’ willingness to bear risk.”132 In a rhetori-
cal twist, Professor Katherine Renshaw argues that 
information disclosure is beneficial because it “can demonstrate 
regulatory failings and thus has the potential to shift political 
and grassroots support towards developing stronger ex ante 
controls.”133 
Within the particular area of environmental regulation, 
disclosure as a regulatory driver has at times been celebrated 
as well.134 As Professor David Case has observed, “Advocates of 
informational regulation argue that public distribution of in-
formation can lead to self-regulatory improvement in the envi-
ronmental performance of business and industry.”135 Most fre-
quently, the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) has been held out as 
an example of how information disclosure regimes can result in 
desired behavioral shifts.136 
 
 132. W. Kip Viscusi & Ted Gayer, Safety at Any Price?, 25 CATO. REV. BUS. 
& GOV’T: REG. 54, 60 (2002); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BE-
YOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 152 (2005) (urging that government 
regulation should respect the fact the people have various appetites and toler-
ances for risk). But cf. Cass R. Sunstein & Lucia A. Reisch, Automatically 
Green: Behavioral Economics and Environmental Protection, 38 HARV. ENVTL. 
L. REV. 127, 127–57 (2014) (arguing for the use of default rules to preserve 
consumer choice while encouraging “greener choices”). 
 133. Katherine Renshaw, Sounding Alarms: Does Informational Regulation 
Help or Hinder Environmentalism?, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 654, 658 (2006). 
 134. See David Case, The Law and Economics of Environmental Infor-
mation as Regulation, 31 ENVTL. L. REV. 10773, 10773 (2007) (“[I]nformation 
disclosure has emerged as a key component of strategies to promote more ef-
fective, less costly alternatives to command-and-control regulation. A number 
of consensus-building forums, expert panels, and policy reports argue that 
public distribution of information can serve as an effective policy tool for driv-
ing improvements in environmental performance.”). 
 135. David W. Case, The Lost Generation: Environmental Regulatory Re-
form in the Era of Congressional Abdication, 25 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 49, 
76–78 (2014). 
 136. Id. at 77. (“The perception that informational regulatory strategies 
can successfully create conditions leading to desireable self-regulatory envi-
ronmental behavior is largely fueled by the relative success of the Toxics Re-
lease Inventory (TRI).”); see also Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as Envi-
ronmental Regulation: TRI and Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a 
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The TRI, created by the Emergency Planning and Commu-
nity Right to Know Act (EPCRA) in 1986, requires manufactur-
ing facilities to submit annual data to the EPA on the amount 
of certain chemicals released into the air, water, or land.137 The 
EPA compiles that information into the TRI, which is publically 
available and has been used by media outlets and groups like 
the Environmental Defense to generate facility “Scorecards.”138 
The public pressure generated by the TRI has been credited for 
a forty percent reduction in the covered chemicals.139 
Even famously progressive states like California have 
made information disclosure the centerpiece of chemical regu-
lation laws adopted to supplement the federal regime. For ex-
ample, California Proposition 65 prohibits manufacturers from 
exposing any person to carcinogens or reproductive toxins 
without providing a clear and reasonable warning.140 The labels 
are generally generic, typically some version of “WARNING: 
This product may contain a chemical known to the State of Cal-
ifornia to cause cancer, or birth defects or other reproductive 
harm.”141 While there have been some benefits of the infor-
 
New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 257, 261–62 (2001); Sunstein, supra note 127, at 
1384 (“Available evidence indicates that the TRI has had beneficial effects, 
helping to spur reductions in toxic releases throughout the United States.”). 
Outside the TRI context, information disclosure as an approach to environ-
mental problems has found cabined support as well. See Sarah E. Light, 
NEPA’s Footprint: Information Disclosure as a Quasi-Carbon Tax on Agencies, 
87 TUL. L. REV. 511, 519 (2013) (“Accurate information can promote and facili-
tate better technology-based direct regulation, more tailored health-based reg-
ulations, improved market approaches through the identification of negative 
or positive externalities, and social norms that promote environmental goals 
and aspirations.”). 
 137. Case, supra note 135, at 77. 
 138. Case, supra note 134, at 10775. 
 139. Id.; see also Case, supra note 135, at 77; Archon Fung & Dara 
O’Rourke, Reinventing Environmental Regulation from the Grassroots, Ex-
plaining and Expanding the Success of the Toxics Release Inventory, 25 ENVTL. 
MGMT. 115, 120–21 (2000) (surveying how citizen groups use TRI data and 
finding that “85% of respondents reported that they used it to exert public 
pressure on facilities and 58% reported that targeted facilities eventually pur-
sued source reduction efforts”). 
 140. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.6 (West 2016), preempted by 
People v. Tri-Union Seafoods, L.L.C., No. CGC-01-402975, 2006 WL 1544384 
(Cal. Super. Ct. May 11, 2006) (“No person in the course of doing business 
shall knowingly and intentionally expose any individual to a chemical known 
to the state to cause cancer or reproductive toxicity without first giving clear 
and reasonable warning to such individual . . . .”). 
 141. Michael Barsa, Note, California’s Proposition 65 and the Limits of In-
formation Economics, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1223, 1228 (1997) (quoting CAL. CODE 
REGS. tit. 22. § 12601(b)(4)(D) (1991)). 
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mation law in terms of incentives on manufacturers to design 
safer products in order to avoid warning labels,142 California 
Proposition 65 leaves members of the public to decipher warn-
ing signs posted in parking lots, banks, apartment complexes,143 
and even Disneyland.144 
Not all of the attention on information disclosure within 
environmental law has been positive, however. Margot Pollans 
writes about consumer decisions in response to food labeling 
and argues that “[p]rovision of information might be counter-
productive or ineffectual, particularly if consumer bias or lack 
of knowledge prevents proper interpretation.”145 Evaluating fu-
ture risk proves especially problematic in the usefulness of la-
beling, she argues.146 California Proposition 65 and its efforts to 
influence chemicals safety through disclosure requirements has 
drawn strong criticism147 on the grounds that the required 
warnings are too vague,148 tend to overstate the risk,149 and are 
 
 142. Id. at 1226, 1238 (arguing that the regulatory regime is successful in 
terms of raising the consciousness of manufacturers and motivating change in 
order to avoid undesired warning labels, instead of defending California Prop-
osition 65 on the basis that it effectively communicates risk); Michael W. Graf, 
Regulating Pesticide Pollution in California Under the 1986 Safe Drinking 
Water and Toxic Exposure Act (Proposition 65), 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 663, 665–66 
(2001) (describing California Proposition 65 as furthering the public’s right to 
know about toxic chemical exposure and arguing for a similar disclosure re-
gime to supplement pesticide regulation). 
 143. See Brendan Borrell, Are Proposition 65 Warnings Healthful or Hurt-
ful?, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2009), http://www.latimes.com/health/la-he-pro-con2 
-2009nov02-story.html. 
 144. See Disneyland Attractions Contain High Levels of Lead, Environmen-
tal Group Alleges, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 23, 2011), http://www 
.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/23/disneyland-attractions-lead-contamination_n_ 
1023825.html. 
 145. Margot J. Pollans, Bundling Public and Private Goods: The Market for 
Sustainable Organics, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 621, 636–37 (2010). 
 146. Id. 
 147. For a thorough critique of the myriad ways California Proposition 65 
fails to provide effective warnings, see Clifford Rechtschaffen, The Warning 
Game: Evaluating Warnings Under California’s Proposition 65, 23 ECOLOGY 
L.Q. 303, 327 (1996). 
 148. Id. at 327 (“Warnings also fail to identify the specific chemicals caus-
ing an exposure.”); see also id. (“The warnings also fail to convey other useful 
information for informed decisionmaking, such as the means of exposure (in-
halation, ingestion, or absorption), or information about steps that can be tak-
en to reduce exposures.”). 
 149. W. KIP VISCUSI, PRODUCT-RISK LABELING: A FEDERAL RESPONSIBIL-
ITY 61–69 (1993); Lars Noah, The Imperative To Warn: Disentangling the 
“Right To Know” from the “Need To Know” About Consumer Product Hazards, 
11 YALE J. ON REG. 293, 298–339 (1994). 
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so commonplace that they are simply ignored by consumers.150 
Even the celebrated TRI has been criticized on the grounds 
that it “omits many environmentally significant chemicals[,] . . . 
focuses on sources that account for a small fraction of releases[, 
and] . . . fails to note distinctions between more and less risky 
pollutants or modes of release.”151 
Scholars outside the area of toxin regulation are likewise 
speaking out against disclosure and notice as viable approaches 
to solve collective action problems. For example, in the privacy 
space, Professor Daniel J. Solove argues that “[t]here are too 
many entities collecting and using personal data to make it fea-
sible for people to manage their privacy separately with each 
entity.”152 These and other structural problems limit the effec-
tiveness of privacy self-management and suggest that manag-
ing personal data is a collective action problem that calls for a 
more coordinated and deliberate regulatory approach. 
Professors Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl Schneider argue 
more globally that mandatory disclosure simply does not work. 
They argue that the sheer volume of disclosures bombarding 
individuals under current regulatory regimes makes meaning-
ful digestion of that information unreasonable: 
Mandated disclosure is a regulatory response to the problems of non-
specialists facing unfamiliar and complex decisions. It is broadly, al-
most indiscriminately, used. But it fails to achieve its goals because 
unfamiliar and complex decisions are much harder than disclosurite 
ideology assumes. Giving consumers information about such decisions 
cannot equip them to make the truly informed decisions that 
disclosurites desire. Mandated disclosure is a fundamental failure 
that cannot be fundamentally fixed.153 
Ben-Shahar and Schneider further explain that the “clutter of 
information” faced by individuals by myriad disclosures across 
many subjects (home loan, privacy disclosure, medical care, 
 
 150. Rechtschaffen, supra note 147, at 355 (discussing the “overwarning” 
problem with California Proposition 65); see also id. (arguing that the volume 
of warnings has diminished the effectiveness of Proposition 65 as a public 
awareness tool (citing Peter H. Weiner, Enforcement of Proposition 65: Un-
clear and Unreasonable?, PROP 65 NEWS, Feb. 1992, at 8)). 
 151. William F. Pederson, Regulation and Information Disclosure: Parallel 
Universes and Beyond, 25 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 151, 152 (2001). 
 152. Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the Con-
sent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1880, 1881 (2013). 
 153. OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED 
TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE 12 (2014); see also Omri 
Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failed Reign of Mandated Disclosure, 
REGBLOG (June 15, 2015), http://www.regblog.org/2015/06/15/ben-shahar 
-schneider-failed-disclosure (discussing the authors’ findings in their book). 
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products labeling) creates an “accumulation problem” and di-
lutes the attention or cognitive understanding that individuals 
can devote to any single disclosure.154 
Beyond its ineffectiveness, Ben-Shahar and Schneider urge 
that mandatory disclosure may be affirmatively doing harm by 
allowing legislators to skirt hard regulatory choices under the 
guise of this “benign” regulatory approach.155 Professors Ryan 
Bubb and Richard H. Pildes similarly argue that the focus of 
behavioral economics on preserving consumer choice has led to 
the endorsement of disclosure regulation even when it might 
not be optimal form a social welfare perspective.156 They argue 
that the field of law “fails to take its own behavioral insights 
seriously enough” and, as a result, those who subscribe to the 
behavioral law and economics paragraph “often artificially and 
wrongly exclude[] more traditional regulatory tools, such as di-
rect mandates, from [their] analysis of policy options.”157 
B. A CRITIQUE OF DISCLOSURE AS A GOVERNANCE TOOL FOR 
CHEMICALS REGULATION 
While much of the scholarly discourse on information dis-
closure has focused on the wisdom of disclosure as an express 
regulatory choice, Professor Catherine A. O’Neill has explained 
that even environmental statutes with directed mandates can 
be unwittingly transformed into disclosure regimes.158 For an 
 
 154. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 126, at 686–90; see also Karen 
Bradshaw Schultz, Information Flooding, 48 IND. L. REV. 755 (2015) (explain-
ing that a major problem of disclosure regulation is “information flooding,” the 
phenomenon of presenting consumers with too much information to process). 
 155. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 126, at 689–90. 
 156. Ryan Bubb & Richard H. Pildes, How Behavioral Economics Trims Its 
Sails and Why, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1593 (2014). 
 157. Id. at 1638, 1597. Professors Bubb and Pildes use fuel-economy stand-
ards to illustrate their point that truncated behavioral economic analyses can 
overlook more optimal regulatory choices: “The upshot of this analysis is that 
incorporating insights from behavioral economics into policy analysis of the 
pollution-externality problem might turn out to justify traditional command-
and-control approaches, rather than more modest disclosure nudges.” Id. at 
1676. Critics of Bubb and Pildes argue economists are not trimming the sails, 
but merely being appropriately cautious. See, e.g., Quinn Curtis et al., Tacking 
in Shifting Winds: A Short Response to Bubb and Pildes, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 
204, 204 (2014) (“[C]hoicepreserving approaches into policymaking may reflect 
the recognition of uncertainty” and may simply be a “rationally cautious ap-
proach to navigating unknown and potentially treacherous policymaking seas 
. . . .”). 
 158. O’Neill, supra note 132, at 276 (“Government decision makers have 
increasingly come to rely on risk avoidance as a form of risk regulation.”). 
  
2352 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [101:2313 
 
example of regulators choosing disclosure over pollution reduc-
tion, consider that the EPA uses fish consumption advisories to 
warn people against consuming mercury-contaminated fish 
from substantial portions of waters of the United States.159 
Some of these advisories, though touted as temporary, have 
been in place since the 1970s.160 By the same token, until re-
cently there have been no federal standards limiting mercury 
emissions from the nation’s largest emitter—power plants.161 
As another example, “ozone alerts” show how risk regula-
tion can devolve into risk avoidance under even our most well-
regarded statutes like the Clean Air Act.162 In particular, the 
Clean Air Act requires states to ensure compliance with Na-
tional Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for six criteria 
pollutants including ozone.163 Despite the regulatory mandate 
to reduce risk, over 160 million people live in areas that do not 
meet the ozone safety standard.164 In the face of the regulatory 
failure, agencies have turned to risk avoidance, using ozone 
alerts to encourage individuals to stay indoors on days when 
ozone levels are unsafe.165 According to Professor O’Neill, 
“Agencies have allowed ozone alerts to supplant risk reduction, 
moreover, despite evidence that the number of individuals who 
suffer from asthma and other respiratory ailments triggered by 
exposure to ground-level ozone has continued to climb.”166 
As Part III explains, TSCA and FIFRA follow this model 
identified by Professor O’Neill, where the implementation of 
the statutes has exacerbated theoretical gaps and resulted in a 
regulatory scheme that operates largely as a risk avoidance 
framework. Because TSCA and FIFRA function like a laissez-
faire disclosure regime, it is worth considering why that ap-
proach is unacceptable. To that end, this Part extends the work 
of scholars who have critically examined information disclosure 
 
 159. Id. at 278–83. 
 160. See, e.g., John Tilden et al., Health Advisories for Consumers of Great 
Lakes Sport Fish: Is the Message Being Received?, 105 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 
1360, 1360 (1997) (noting that Great Lakes fish advisories were first issued in 
the 1970s for PCB contamination). 
 161. See Basic Information About Mercury and Air Toxics Standards, U.S. 
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/mats/basic-information 
-about-mercury-and-air-toxics-standards (last visited Apr. 24, 2017). 
 162. O’Neill, supra note 132, at 290. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 291. 
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in other contexts. It advances three reasons to reject a laissez-
faire, disclosure-based approach to chemicals and pesticide 
regulation: First, setting information gaps aside, individuals 
cannot assess cumulative risk. Second, even if they could, the 
pervasiveness of chemicals in the ambient environment means 
individuals cannot opt out of the risk. Third, because not all in-
dividuals are similarly situated, government action is neces-
sary to avoid disparate impacts to vulnerable populations. In 
the end, the reasons for rejecting a disclosure regime are also 
the reasons for ensuring cumulative risk is assessed and used 
as a metric for reducing overall risk. 
1. Individuals Cannot Assess Cumulative Risk 
Cumulative risk assessments are too complex for non-
experts to sort out. Risk scientists know this.167 In one research 
paper, the authors discuss in great detail the various tools 
available to communities for assessing cumulative risk.168 The 
real illumination comes at the end when the authors emphasize 
that analyzing cumulative risk requires technical expertise at 
every level, from finding the relevant information to using ex-
posure models to interpreting the results: “the compilation of 
information from different tools . . . can be very challenging,” 
“mining and analyzing information may be challenging without 
technical training,” “[e]xposure models often require a high lev-
el of technical expertise,” and “their results can also be difficult 
to interpret without a working knowledge of exposure assess-
ments.”169 
Similarly, the EPA emphasized the technocratic nature of 
cumulative risk assessments in its study of organophosphates: 
“Interpretation of the risk estimates presented in this updated 
OP CRA depends upon the synthesis and processing of a vast 
body of data on hazard and exposures and no single value in 
the assessment should be used to independently arrive at the 
interpretation of the risk estimates or results.”170 And if one can 
use length as a proxy for complexity, consider that the update 
to which the EPA was referring spanned 522 pages of text, ta-
bles, figures, and appendices.171 
 
 167. See infra Part I.B.1 (discussing technical challenges in assessing cu-
mulative risk). 
 168. Barzyk et al., supra note 97, at 378–81. 
 169. Id. at 382–83. 
 170. EPA, OP CRA, supra note 59, at 12 (emphasis omitted). 
 171. Id. 
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This and other cumulative risk assessments that have been 
completed illustrate why these issues cannot be undertaken by 
the individual and/or chalked up to consumer choice issues. 
Consider the EPA’s study on disinfection byproducts in water, 
which highlights the various pieces of information that re-
searchers have to pull together to arrive at a cumulative risk 
assessment: (1) identifying classes of chemicals that lead to the 
same adverse outcome requires understanding something 
about the health impacts and toxicological characteristics of in-
dividual chemicals; (2) choosing a model for how these chemi-
cals interact when mixed together requires knowing whether 
impacts from individual chemicals are additive or whether 
there are synergistic interactions from the mixtures; and (3) 
developing an overall risk characterization requires under-
standing how the population is exposed and in what doses.172 
The idea that individuals can assess risk is further compli-
cated by the lack of information regarding the health impacts of 
many chemicals to which individuals are exposed. The infor-
mation deficit that plagues chemical regulation in the United 
States is well known.173 This information gap makes risk as-
sessment for even individual chemicals or products challenging, 
never mind the task of synthesizing risk across several prod-
ucts or common chemicals.174 Of course, the information gap 
does not go away by asking regulators or manufacturers to un-
dertake cumulative risk assessments. That said, matching the 
responsibility for assessment with actors capable of producing 
or requiring that information is far more likely to address in-
formation gaps. To that end, individuals are in the worst posi-
tion for acquiring the needed information or generating lever-
age to demand its production.175 
On one level, individuals may be unable to assess cumula-
tive risk because of too little information. On another level, the 
problem may be too much information, with the irrelevant ob-
scuring the relevant or the good obscuring the bad. Professor 
Karen Bradshaw Schultz has written about the phenomenon 
 
 172. See Teuschler et al., supra note 66, at 756–57. 
 173. Wagner, supra note 19, at 1624. 
 174. Id. 
 175. For one reason why individuals may fare poorly in eliciting infor-
mation about chemical toxicity, see Peter S. Menell, Structuring a Market-
Oriented Federal Eco-Information Policy, 54 MD. L. REV. 1435, 1445 (1995) 
(“The unregulated market may fail to provide adequate information about en-
vironmental impacts of consumer choice because it is difficult to appropriate 
sufficient return for generating such information.”). 
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where firms, nongovernmental organizations, agencies, and po-
litical parties alike strategically inundate the marketplace with 
information to influence consumers.176 This flood of information 
serves to overwhelm and confuse consumers, further undermin-
ing the workability of disclosure regulation or reliance on con-
sumer choice models of risk management.177 
Whatever the case may be—too little information or too 
much—the bottom line is that even with just-right knowledge, 
cumulative risk assessments require some expert knowledge on 
issues of risk exposure and toxicology. The many facets of 
knowledge that are required to assess cumulative risk under-
scores the absurdity of the “individual vigilance” strategy for 
dealing with issues of chemical and pesticide proliferation. In-
deed, even if individuals were capable of such risk assessment, 
it would be economically inefficient to suggest that individuals 
should be responsible. Doing so forces each individual, even 
those without specialized training in risk assessment or toxi-
cology to behave as experts. This approach is duplicative and 
requires individuals to unnecessarily divert energy and re-
sources away from more productive societal contributions. 
2. Individuals Cannot Opt out of Risk 
Even if individuals could assess cumulative risk, and even 
if informational problems were alleviated, there is another fun-
damental reason why issues of cumulative risk need govern-
mental response: individuals cannot opt out of exposure to tox-
ins. Chemicals and pesticides are so ubiquitous in the ambient 
environment that individuals have no ability to avoid exposure 
no matter the degree of vigilance deployed. The existing regula-
tory regime—which for decades has left open the toggle switch 
for chemicals entering the marketplace and environment—has 
created public health externalities that require collective regu-
latory action to resolve. 
As an example of how consumer products can wreak public 
health havoc, consider that companies like DuPont that have 
little to gain from disclosing health risks from widespread 
products. In 2016, the New York Times Magazine ran a feature 
article on the rising public health concerns from a chemical 
called perfluorooctanoic acid, or PFOA.178 Invented by 3M in 
 
 176. Schultz, supra note 154, at 757–62. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Rich, supra note 12. 
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1947, PFOA has been used in a wide range of products for its 
non-stick, stain-proofing, and water-proofing properties.179 
From Teflon coating in frying pans to Scotchguard furniture 
protectants,180 these convenience products were sold under the 
banner of improving quality of life—no more scrubbing pans or 
furniture to get the stains out. As it turns out, the health risks 
from PFOA exposure are potentially significant; in 2011 gov-
ernment scientists released findings of a “probable link” be-
tween PFOA and “kidney cancer, testicular cancer, thyroid dis-
ease, high cholesterol, pre-eclampsia and ulcerative colitis.”181 
DuPont, which has purchased PFOA for its use in Teflon 
since 1951, has conducted private medical studies of PFOA for 
four decades.182 By the early 1990s, results from these studies 
raised enough suspicions to cause DuPont and 3M to consider 
less-toxic alternatives to PFOA.183 DuPont opted against those 
alternatives and against sharing its concerns about PFOA with 
the EPA or the public.184 In the meantime, PFOA continued to 
enter the marketplace and drinking water.185 By the time the 
regulatory agencies and public had enough information to start 
asking public health questions, PFOA had become common-
place in the ambient environment.186 A study by the Environ-
mental Working Group in 2015 showed that ninety-four water 
systems across twenty-four states had PFOA levels exceeding 
the safety threshold approximated by an earlier report from re-
searchers at the Harvard School of Public Health.187 In the wa-
ter districts closest to DuPont’s Washington Works plant in 
Parkersburg, West Virginia, earlier tests had shown that public 
and private water source “were tainted with levels of PFOA 
higher than DuPont’s own internal safety standard.”188 
Open questions remain as to what exposure levels cause 
harm. But as public health questions are sorted out, there is at 
least one unfortunate certainty—individuals concerned about 
PFOA can stop buying products with Teflon but they cannot 
 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
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avoid exposure to PFOA. In fact, DuPont stopped manufactur-
ing PFOA in 2013, but PFOA is still present in the environ-
ment.189 As the New York Times Magazine reported, “Where 
scientists have tested for the presence of PFOA in the world, 
they have found it.”190 How much comfort is the idea of “indi-
vidual vigilance” and “consumer choice” when PFOA has been 
detected in American blood banks since 1976?191 
[I]f you are a sentient being reading this article in 2016, you already 
have PFOA in your blood. It is in your parents’ blood, your children’s 
blood, your lover’s blood. How did it get there? Through the air, 
through your diet, through your use of nonstick cookware, through 
your umbilical cord. Or you might have drunk tainted water.192 
While PFOA is not manufactured anymore, substitute chemi-
cals that are also part of the fluorochemicals family have yet to 
undergo safety testing.193 A group of scientists and other profes-
sionals from around the globe signed the “Madrid Statement” 
in May 2015 expressing concern about the replacement chemi-
cals.194 
Unfortunately, this story is not an outlier.195 As another 
example of how chemicals exposure is not always a choice, con-
sider children that are exposed to pesticide through drift in ru-
ral communities. In 2009, Earthjustice submitted a petition to 
the EPA on behalf of the United Farmworkers and other non-
governmental organizations.196 The petition asked the EPA to 
 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. “The EPA was particularly alarmed to learn that PFOA had been de-
tected in American blood banks, something 3M and DuPont had known as ear-
ly as 1976. By 2003 the average concentration of PFOA in the blood of an adult 
American was four to five parts per billion.” Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. “Under the 1976 Toxic Substances Control Act, the EPA can test 
chemicals only when it has been provided evidence of harm. This arrange-
ment, which largely allows chemical companies to regulate themselves, is the 
reason that the EPA has restricted only five chemicals, out of tens of thou-
sands on the market, in the last 40 years.” Id. 
 194. See Arlene Blum et al., The Madrid Statement on Poly- and 
Perfluoroalkyl Substances (PFASs), 123 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. A107 (2015), 
http://ehp.niehs.nih.gov/1509934. 
 195. Consider, for example, that in 1999 the U.S. Geological Survey found 
that “96 percent of all fish analyzed in major rivers and streams contained res-
idues of one or more pesticides at detectable levels.” ENVT. & HUMAN HEALTH, 
INC., RISKS FROM LAWN CARE PESTICIDES: INCLUDING INADEQUATE PACKAG-
ING AND LABELING 8 (2003), http://www.ehhi.org/reports/lcpesticides/ 
lawnpest_full.pdf. 
 196. Pesticides in the Air – Kids at Risk: Petition to EPA To Protect Chil-
dren from Pesticide Drift, Pesticide Action Network v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agen-
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“expeditiously evaluate the exposure of children to pesticide 
drift and impose safeguards to ensure that children are pro-
tected from aggregate pesticide exposures, including pesticide 
drift.”197 In support of concerns about drift exposure, the peti-
tion submitted evidence from several air monitoring studies 
conducted near rural elementary schools in states nationwide. 
For example: 
In 2007, an air monitoring study conducted near the Southwoods El-
ementary School in Hastings, Florida, detected four pesticides—
endosulfan, diazinon, trifluralin, and chlorothalonil. At least one pes-
ticide was found in each of the 39 samples, with three or four of the 
pesticides detected in 74% of samples, sometimes at levels exceeding 
levels of concern based on end points selected by the EPA as appro-
priate for assessing inhalation risk. Exposure to these four chemicals 
is associated with a wide range of adverse health effects—endosulfan 
interferes with hormones and was linked to autism in an epidemiolog-
ical study, diazinon is neurotoxic, and trifluralin and chlorothalonil 
are rated by the EPA as “possible” and “probable” carcinogens, respec-
tively.198 
The Petition also cited other air monitoring reports,199 as well 
as a number of epidemiological studies linking pesticide drift to 
health effects.200 To protect children from drift, the petition ar-
gued that the “EPA should impose no-spray buffer zones for 
dangerous drift-prone pesticides around homes, schools, parks, 
daycare centers, and other places where children congregate.”201 
 
cy, No. 13-72616 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 13, 2009), https://www.farmworkerjustice 
.org/sites/default/files/Petition%20-%20Pesticides%20in%20the%20Air%20 
-%20Kids%20at%20Risk.pdf [hereinafter Pesticides in the Air]. 
 197. Id. at 1. 
 198. Id. at 9 (footnotes omitted). 
 199. See, e.g., id. at 9 (“In 2004, a study by scientists from the University of 
Washington and Washington State University on the organophosphate 
methamidophos determined that pesticide volatilization drift ‘could be a po-
tentially high percentage of inhalation exposure.’” (quoting Jaya Ramaprasad 
et al., The Washington Aerial Spray Drift Study: Assessment of Off-Target 
Organophosphorus Insecticide Atmospheric Movement by Plant Surface Volati-
lization, 38 ATMOSPHERIC ENVT. 5703, 5703–13 (2004))). 
 200. See id. at 8 (“[A] growing number of epidemiological studies link pesti-
cide drift to specific adverse health effects in humans, including autism spec-
trum disorders, Parkinson’s disease, and childhood acute lymphoblastic leu-
kemia.” (footnote omitted) (citing Sadie Costello et al., Parkinson’s Disease and 
Residential Exposure to Maneb and Paraquat from Agricultural Applications 
in the Central Valley of California, 169 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 919, 919 
(2009))); Eric M. Roberts et al., Maternal Residence near Agricultural Pesticide 
Applications and Autism Spectrum Disorders Among Children in the Califor-
nia Central Valley, 115 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 1482 (2007); Rudolph P. Rull 
et al., Residential Proximity to Agricultural Pesticide Applications and Child-
hood Acute Lymphoblastic Leukemia, 109 ENVTL. RES. 891 (2009). 
 201. Pesticides in the Air, supra note 196, at 4. 
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The EPA responded to the petition in 2014, sharing the pe-
titioners’ concerns that “the risks from drift and volatilization 
must be accounted for, for both children and adults, and that 
action must be taken to mitigate those risks.”202 While acknowl-
edging that drift risks are important and had not been system-
atically taken into account by the agency, the EPA denied the 
request to take interim safety measures of implementing spray 
buffers around areas where children are likely to be present 
and subject to drift.203 In response, Earthjustice noted its disap-
pointment, which can best be summed up with its observation 
that “[a]cknowledging risk does not, on its own, reduce risk.”204 
To date, the EPA’s responses to problems of drift have been 
limited to developing assessment tools, improving produce la-
bels, and implementing a voluntary “Pesticide Drift Reduction 
Technology” program to encourage the use of safer spray 
equipment.205 In the meantime, while voluntary disclosure ef-
forts characterize the EPA’s regulatory agenda, children and 
rural families are left with little ability to avoid drift exposure. 
In addition to illustrating the difficulty of opting out of 
chemical exposure, the example of pesticide drift also under-
scores the broader point of this Article: protecting public health 
requires risk reduction, not just assessment, acknowledgement 
or disclosure. In particular, regulatory drivers should trigger 
risk reduction mandates based on understandings of cumula-
tive risk. 
For one last example on the pervasiveness of certain chem-
icals in the ambient environment and the growing inability to 
opt out of exposure, consider methyl tert-butyl ether (MTBE). 
MTBE is a gasoline additive, used as an anti-knocking agent 
and to reduce carbon monoxide emissions since the 1980s.206 
 
 202. Letter from Martha Monell, Acting Dir., Office of Pesticide Programs, 
to Erik Nicholson et al., Nat’l Vice President, United Farm Workers (Mar. 31, 
2014), http://www.panna.org/sites/default/files/petition%20response% 
20transmittal%20letter%203_31_14.pdf [hereinafter EPA Letter]. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Written Objections to EPA’s Response to Pesticides in the Air — Kids 
at Risk: Petition to EPA To Protect Children from Pesticide Drift, Pesticide 
Action Network v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, No. 13-72616, at 11 (W.D. Wash. 
May 28, 2014), http://earthjustice.org/sites/default/files/files/ 
2743writtenobjections5-28-14.pdf. 
 205. See What EPA Is Doing To Reduce Pesticide Drift, U.S. ENVTL. PRO-
TECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/reducing-pesticide-drift/what-epa-doing 
-reduce-pesticide-drift (last visited Apr. 24, 2017). 
 206. See National Biomonitoring Program: Biomonitoring Summary, CTRS. 
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/biomonitoring/ 
  
2360 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [101:2313 
 
Perhaps best known for causing persistent groundwater con-
tamination,207 MTBE has also been a poster child for the fail-
ings of TSCA.208 More specifically, ARCO began manufacturing 
MTBE in 1979.209 Under the watch of TSCA, it went to market 
without toxicity testing.210 After MTBE became widely used, af-
ter it had contaminated groundwater and entered the ambient 
air through vehicle emissions, after the industry had begun to 
learn more about the toxicity of MTBE—only then did the regu-
lators begin to ask questions about risk.211 Today there remains 
uncertainty over the health risks of MTBE exposure. The EPA 
at one time recognized MTBE as a “potential human carcino-
gen” at high doses.212 Little is known about health impacts from 
long-term, chronic exposure.213 
Concerned about its susceptibility to contaminate ground-
water, states like California and New York have banned 
MTBE.214 Because of these bans, concerns about liability, and 
policy changes set in motion in the Energy Policy Act of 2005, 
many companies have switched from using MTBE to ethanol in 
 
MTBE_BiomonitoringSummary.html [hereinafter Biomonitoring Summary] 
(last visited Apr. 24, 2017). 
 207. Professor Thomas O. McGarity has written about the history and les-
sons learned from the “MBTE fiasco.” Thomas O. McGarity, MBTE: A Precau-
tionary Tale, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 281 (2004). 
 208. See, e.g., Bernard Goldstein, MTBE: A Poster Child for Exposure As-
sessment as Central to Effective TSCA Reform, 20 J. EXPOSURE SCI. & ENVTL. 
EPIDEMIOLOGY 229, 229–30 (2010), http://www.nature.com/jes/journal/v20/n3/ 
full/jes201017a.html. 
 209. McGarity, supra note 207, at 297. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. at 298–300. 
 212. Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Overview, U.S. ENVTL. PROTEC-
TION AGENCY, https://archive.epa.gov/mtbe/web/html/faq.html [hereinafter 
MTBE Overview] (last visited Apr. 24, 2017); see also Kathleen M. Burns & 
Ronald L. Melnick, MBTE: Recent Carcinogenity Studies, 18 INT’L J. OCCUPA-
TIONAL & ENVTL. HEALTH 66, 68 (2012), http://www.sciencecorps.org/ 
Cancer%20evid-ence%20MTBE%202012.pdf (“With substantial evidence of 
genotoxicity now available, it is entirely plausible that MTBE would cause 
cancer in multiple organs.”); McGarity, supra note 207, at 288 (noting EPA 
has classified MTBE as a potential human carcinogen). 
 213. See McGarity, supra note 207 at 288 (“On the whole, though, there is a 
dearth of health effects data on MTBE—a worrisome fact given that it has 
been more than twenty years since its introduction into gasoline on a broad 
basis.”); see also MTBE Overview, supra note 212. (“[R]esearchers have limited 
data about what the health effects may be if a person swallows (ingests) 
MTBE.”). 
 214. McGarity, supra note 207, at 282 n.4. 
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their gasoline formulations.215 According to the EPA, MTBE has 
not been used in significant quantities since 2005.216 
Still, despite the industry’s move away from MTBE, the 
chemical lives on in our bloodstreams. According to 2009 CDC 
biomonitoring results, MBTE is found in human blood.217 In 
particular, “[c]ommuters in urban areas with high vehicular 
traffic had median blood MTBE blood levels that were more 
than tenfold higher than those in the U.S. general popula-
tion.”218 The CDC, like the EPA, cannot say what this means in 
terms of health impacts.219 
MBTE has been a poster child for the enduring problems 
that are created when chemicals are allowed to enter the mar-
ketplace without understanding the health and ecological risks. 
But it is also a good example of how the shortcomings of TSCA 
constrain consumer choice. In other words, when chemicals en-
ter the marketplace, they inevitably enter the environment. 
And depending on the quantities at which they are produced, 
those chemicals become part of the background world in which 
we live. Exposure moves beyond the realm of consumer choice. 
These constraints on consumer choice can be significant. In its 
Framework on Cumulative Risk Assessments, for example, the 
EPA recognizes that chemical exposure from the ambient envi-
ronment are generally important and relevant considerations 
when assessing public health harms.220 
These examples of chemical risk from the ambient envi-
ronment underscore how the regulation of chemicals and pesti-
cides before they enter the marketplace is an obvious step to 
protecting public health. They also point to the simple fact that 
avoiding exposure to chemicals and pesticides is not an issue of 
consumer choice, but rather a matter of government regulation 
in response to a collective action problem. Finally, these exam-
ples demonstrate why relying on disclosure and consumer-
 
 215. MTBE Overview, supra note 212. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Biomonitoring Summary, supra note 206 (“Levels of MTBE in blood 
reflect recent exposure.”). 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. (“Human health effects from MTBE at low environmental doses or 
at biomonitored levels from low environmental exposures are unknown.”). 
 220. See EPA, FRAMEWORK, supra note 10, at 98 (“Because cumulative risk 
assessments are population based, exposures due to naturally occurring back-
ground concentrations should typically be considered important.”) Naturally 
occurring means from the environment or part of background from anthropo-
genic sources. 
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generated pressure on firms to explore green chemistry comes 
too late in the equation, after costly damage has already been 
done. On that point, bear in mind that none of these examples 
even scratch the surface of ecological harms that may be result-
ing from our decades-long experiment with chemical prolifera-
tion. To state concerns about human health, for example, says 
nothing about the bees or other ecological resources serving 
valuable functions within the human-ecological community.221 
3. Private Burdens Are Not Evenly Distributed 
Not all citizens are equally situated to assess risk and 
make choices to avoid it. As scholars like Professor Catherine 
A. O’Neill have documented, the poor, uneducated are more 
likely to suffer from chronic toxic exposure.222 Risk scientists 
and the National Environmental Justice Advisory Council have 
likewise studied the disproportionate burdens of chemical and 
pesticide exposure on vulnerable communities.223 Even some 
statutory frameworks, like the Clean Air Act, recognize that 
additional regulatory measures are sometimes warranted to 
adequately protect sensitive or vulnerable populations.224 Dis-
 
 221. For a popular press primer on the concerns about pesticides and bees, 
see Jennifer S. Holland, The Plight of the Honeybee, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC NEWS 
(May 10, 2013), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2013/13/130510 
-honeybee-bee-science-european-union-pesticides-colony-collapse-epa-science; 
Alex Morris, What Is Killing America’s Bees and What Does It Mean for Us?, 
ROLLINGSTONE (Aug. 18, 2015), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/ 
what-is-killing-americas-bees-and-what-does-it-mean-for-us-20150818?page=2. 
 222. See Catherine A. O’Neill, Mercury, Risk, and Justice, 34 ENVTL. L. 
REP. 11070 (2004) [hereinafter O’Neill, Mercury, Risk, and Justice] (explaining 
how the EPA’s Clean Air Mercury Rule leaves those most exposed to under-
take risk avoidance); Catherine A. O’Neill, Risk Avoidance, Cultural Discrimi-
nation, and Environmental Justice for Indigenous Peoples, 30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 
(2003). 
 223. See, e.g., Peter L. deFur et al., Vulnerability as a Function of Individ-
ual and Group Resources in Cumulative Risk Assessment, 115 ENVTL. HEALTH 
PERSP. 817, 819 (2007) (“The evidence suggests a pattern of disproportionate 
exposures to environmental risks among communities of color and the poor, 
with racial differences often persisting across economic strata.”); NAT’L ENVTL. 
JUSTICE ADVISORY COUNCIL, ENSURING RISK REDUCTION IN COMMUNITIES 
WITH MULTIPLE STRESSORS: ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND CUMULATIVE 
RISKS/IMPACTS 1–2 (2004) [hereinafter NEJAC 2004 REPORT] (describing a 
“matrix of physical, chemical, biological, social, and cultural factors which re-
sult in certain communities and sub-populations being more susceptible to en-
vironmental toxins, being more exposed, or having compromised ability to cope 
with and/or recover from such exposure”). 
 224. See Lewis et al., supra note 39, at 2025 (“The consideration of vulner-
able or sensitive populations in human health risk assessments is not new. . . . 
[The] EPA is mandated under the Clean Air Act to provide a margin of safety 
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parate and disproportionate impacts of chemical exposure are 
yet further reasons why chemicals regulation that leaves the 
toggle switch open and masks ineffectiveness with labeling re-
quirements is an inappropriate governmental response. 
The cumulative risk literature is particularly useful in 
highlighting the many factors that contribute to disproportion-
ate impacts on low-income, minority, or other vulnerable com-
munities. The EPA 2003 Framework on Cumulative Risk As-
sessment describes four properties of vulnerability: exposure, 
susceptibility, preparedness, and responsiveness.225 
Looking first at exposure, consider that for vulnerable 
communities exposure is not just an issue of absolute risk. It is 
also an issue of relative risk. As the environmental justice 
movement has recognized for some time, vulnerable popula-
tions bear the brunt of toxic exposures because of geographic 
proximity to polluting facilities. Cancer Alley in Louisiana is a 
popular image.226 In addition to intensely concentrated pockets 
of industry in low-income urban communities, issues of differ-
ential exposure arise in rural communities as well. The dispro-
portionate impact of pesticide use on farmworkers and their 
families is one example.227 For Native American tribal commu-
nities, issues of differential exposure most often arise in the 
context of mercury exposure from fish consumption.228 
Turning next to susceptibility, consider that, even in the 
face of similar levels of exposure some populations are more 
likely to suffer harm do to synergistic interactions with 
nonchemical stressors. A growing body of evidence suggests 
that social, physical, and other nonchemical stressors can exac-
erbate the health impacts of chemical pollutants.229 For exam-
ple, poor nutrition, noise, obesity, or psychosocial stress can 
 
to protect sensitive sub-populations by considering vulnerability and suscepti-
bility factors in its health assessments.”). 
 225. EPA, FRAMEWORK, supra note 10, at 39–41. 
 226. Cancer Alley is the nickname given to an eighty-five-mile corridor that 
stretches from Baton Rouge to New Orleans and supports over 150 industrial 
plants and refineries. For an example of popular news coverage of the area, 
see Trymaine Lee, Cancer Alley: Big Industry, Big Problems, MSNBC, http:// 
www.msnbc.com/interactives/geography-of-poverty/se.html (last visited Apr. 
24, 2017). 
 227. See Beamer, supra note 107. 
 228. See O’Neill, Mercury, Risk and Justice, supra note 222, at 11071. 
 229. Lewis et al., supra note 39, at 2021 (“Researchers have identified dis-
parities for numerous health outcomes among disadvantaged populations and 
hypothesize that exposures to combinations of non-chemical and chemical 
stressors contribute to these disparities . . . .”). 
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impact a body’s ability to recover from harmful exposures.230 
There are reasons, therefore, to be especially concerned about 
the exposure of vulnerable populations to toxins. 
Finally, on the issue of preparedness and responsiveness, 
consider that not everyone is equally capable of reducing risk. 
Not every family has the means to buy organic foods or move to 
a neighborhood with cleaner water. As the literature reflects, 
access to health care, income levels, unemployment, and family 
mobility may impact preparedness and responsiveness to chem-
icals exposure.231 In other words, when it comes to toxicological 
risk assessment, having the information to assess cumulative 
risk, the bandwidth to think about it, or the means to make dif-
ferent choices are all separate matters. In that way, both the 
preparedness and responsiveness properties of the EPA frame-
work speak directly to notions of choice and opt-out ability dis-
cussed throughout this Article.232 In the face of claims for indi-
vidual vigilance or calls for “freedom of choice” within 
regulatory frameworks, it is worth thinking about the degree to 
which vulnerable communities are able to avoid chemicals ex-
posure or mitigate situational susceptibility. 
In the end, addressing these disparate impacts is a classic 
role of government. The Office of the President has long recog-
nized the responsibility of federal agencies to take special care 
in ensuring their activities do not result in “disproportionately 
high and adverse human health or environmental effects” on 
certain vulnerable populations.233 In particular, Executive Or-
der 12898 directs each federal agency to make “environmental 
justice part of its mission.”234 
 
 230. deFur et al., supra note 223 (“Illness may also compromise the capaci-
ty to cope and recover from the adverse effects of environmental exposures.”) 
According to one study, “[v]ulnerability to cumulative risk exposure among 
primary school children is higher among those with negative emotionality 
(fearfulness, irritability, startle responses).” Id. at 820 (citing Liliana J. 
Lengua, The Contribution of Emotionality and Self-Regulation to the Under-
standing of Children’s Response to Multiple Risk, 73 CHILD DEV. 144 (2002)). 
On the flip side, “[a]mong adults, optimism appears to offer protection against 
a wide range of physical and psychologically threatening conditions.” Id. (cit-
ing Michael F. Scheier & Michael W. Bridges, Person Variables and Health: 
Personality Predispositions and Acute Psychological States as Shared Deter-
minants for Disease, 57 PSYCHOSOMATIC MED. 255 (1995)). 
 231. EPA, FRAMEWORK, supra note 10, at 41. 
 232. Id. 
 233. E.g., Exec. Order No. 12898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 16, 1994). 
 234. Id. § 1-101. 
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For its part, the EPA has recognized that the cumulative 
risk lens can help answer that call, acknowledging that 
“[c]umulative risk assessments may be uniquely situated to ad-
dressing the issues related to vulnerability.”235 In a similar 
vein, the National Environmental Justice Advisory Council 
(NEJAC), upon request from the EPA’s Office of Environmental 
Justice, prepared a report addressing the long- and short-term 
actions the agency should take in ensuring environmental jus-
tice for all communities. Cumulative risk assessment was at 
the center of the NEJAC’s recommendations for how to “insti-
tutionalize a bias for action within [the] EPA.”236 
Several state agencies have made the connection between 
cumulative risk assessments and addressing environmental 
justice concerns. States like California and Texas are develop-
ing screening methods or setting legislative directives to use 
cumulative risk as a means of setting regulatory priorities 
among communities in need of risk-reduction resources.237 The 
Texas Water Code, for example, directs the state agency to 
“protect the public from cumulative risks in areas of concen-
trated operations” and “give priority to monitoring and en-
forcement in areas in which regulated facilities are concentrat-
ed.”238 
At the federal level, these acknowledgments and recom-
mendations need to be put to action. As Part III discusses, the 
regulatory framework is still too weak to take the widespread 
support for cumulative risk assessment and make it a trigger 
for risk-reducing action. Without that action, the disparate im-
pacts will continue to manifest, the disclosure fallacy will con-
tinue to give false hope to individuals that risk can be avoided, 
and real risk-reduction efforts will be buried in the drawer of 
good intentions. 
*** 
Understanding the historical support for disclosure regula-
tion in the United States across a range of issues, and examin-
 
 235. EPA, FRAMEWORK, supra note 10, at 41. 
 236. NEJAC 2004 REPORT, supra note 223, at 3; id. at ii (“[T]he EPA’s 
Framework for Cumulative Risk Assessment represents a profound advance-
ment in the kinds of thinking that will help communities and tribes address 
their concerns.”); id. at 15 (incorporating the EPA’s Cumulative Risk Frame-
work into a model that is “sensitive to the ‘real life’ context of communities 
and tribes suffering environmental injustice”). 
 237. See, e.g., TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 5.130 (West 2016). 
 238. Id. § 5.130(1)–(2). 
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ing why addressing chemicals and pesticide regulation through 
information disclosure is a fool’s errand, helps underscore two 
fundamental points: First, addressing public health concerns 
related to chemical and pesticide proliferation requires gate-
keeping before chemicals enter the marketplace. Leaving the 
toggle switch open and hoping individuals can avoid risk if giv-
en appropriate information is not an acceptable approach; hope 
is not a regulatory strategy. Second, not only is gatekeeping 
necessary, but any meaningful gatekeeping should systemati-
cally address issues of cumulative risk. 
III.  THE HISTORY AND FAILURE TO REGULATE 
CUMULATIVE RISK   
The first two Parts of this Article have laid the groundwork 
for understanding why cumulative risk assessments are neces-
sary to chemical and pesticide regulation and how risk science 
has evolved to make regulation on this basis feasible. This Part 
turns to the history of chemical and pesticide regulation in the 
United States. It tells a story of how assessing cumulative risk 
has had little regulatory backing or success despite theoretical 
promise. In particular, TSCA and FIFRA—the two pieces of 
federal legislation most directly charged with regulating toxin 
input into the marketplace for the past several decades—have 
largely failed to address the cumulative risk aspects of chemi-
cal and pesticide proliferation. 
While some of these failings derive from structural flaws in 
the statutes, many of the failings result from implementation 
gaps. Regulators have the room under both statutes to address 
cumulative risk. In fact, Congress has in varying degrees rec-
ognized that cumulative risk is an important piece of the public 
health picture in the chemical age. In some cases, the gaps in 
implementation are the function of flaws in the underlying 
statutory structure. In others, regulators have failed to exercise 
that authority. In still others, court decisions have impeded 
meaningful regulation. 
Understanding the implementation gaps that have plagued 
TSCA and FIFRA provides the necessary context for Part IV, 
which examines how the recently adopted chemicals reform leg-
islation—signed into law by President Obama on June 22, 
2016—can be implemented to avoid similar pitfalls. Important-
ly, the new Act contains the same safety threshold as TSCA for 
allowing chemicals to enter the marketplace—chemicals must 
not pose an “unreasonable risk.” This, too, is the basic thresh-
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old for approving pesticide registrations under FIFRA. Appre-
ciating how this safety threshold has functioned under TSCA 
and FIFRA is necessary to exploring how it might function in 
the future to bring cumulative risk more to the forefront in 
public health protection. 
As a preliminary observation, note that much of the legal 
scholarship separates out the discussion of FIFRA from TSCA, 
perhaps because the statutes have different political land-
scapes and policies that drive their implementation. This Arti-
cle tackles both frameworks in a single discussion because both 
contribute to the overall public health concerns. Pesticides are 
in fact chemicals designed to cause harm to living organisms.239 
From a public health perspective, then, the human body and 
the environment do not make distinctions between chemicals 
and pesticides to reflect policy. When examining the public 
health challenges of the chemicals age, therefore, chemical and 
pesticide regulation need to be considered together. 
A. TSCA: PROMISE UNDELIVERED 
The story of TSCA can be understood as a tragic disconnect 
of what it could have been and what it became. TSCA was en-
acted in 1976 to address a growing concern with chemical pro-
liferation in the U.S. marketplace.240 In particular, there were 
over 61,000 chemicals in existence at the time TSCA was 
adopted and very little was known about their toxin profiles.241 
Despite several other pieces of landmark environmental legis-
lation passed in the 1970s, none had addressed toxic substanc-
es at the point at which they entered the market.242 Rather, 
statutes like the Clean Air Act or Clean Water Act dealt with 
pollutants and other toxins at the point of emission or dis-
charge. TSCA by contrast was intended to deal with chemical 
regulation head on, and as such was heralded by then-EPA 
 
 239. FIFRA defines “pesticide” as “any substance or mixture of substances 
intended for preventing, destroying, repelling, or mitigating any pest.” 7 
U.S.C. § 136(u) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 240. See Presidential Statement on Signing S.3149 (Oct. 12, 1976) (“This 
toxic substances control legislation provides broad authority to regulate any of 
the tens of thousands of chemicals in commerce. Only a few of these chemicals 
have been tested for their long-term effects on human health or the environ-
ment.”). 
 241. See David Markell, An Overview of TSCA, Its History and Key Under-
lying Assumptions, and Its Place in Environmental Regulation, 32 WASH. U. 
J.L. & POL’Y 333, 340 (2010). 
 242. Id. 
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Administrator Russell Train as “one of the most important 
pieces of ‘preventative medicine legislation’ ever passed by 
Congress.”243 
Importantly, when it adopted TSCA, Congress was fully 
aware of the public health concerns associated with cumulative 
exposures. Speaking to the basis for the legislation, congres-
sional records reflect the view that: 
[i]ntelligent standards for regulating exposures to a chemical in the 
workplace, the home or elsewhere in the environment cannot be set 
unless the full extent of human or environmental exposure is consid-
ered. The importance of considering the cumulative impact of all 
sources of exposure and the synergistic effects resulting from expo-
sure to a number of chemicals in regulating hazardous chemicals was 
pointed out by the National Academy of Sciences . . . .244 
This broad level of concern for cumulative and synergistic 
impacts was not just lip service. The Conference Report ex-
pressly contemplates that these types of impacts would be con-
sidered in TSCA’s safety standard. Recall that for both new and 
existing chemicals the EPA also had authority to take action 
and ban existing chemicals that present “an unreasonable risk 
of injury to health or the environment.”245 In its discussion of 
§ 6 of the Act, the Conference Report emphasizes that 
“[o]ftentimes an unreasonable risk will be presented because of 
the interrelationship or cumulative impact of a number of dif-
ferent substances or mixtures. The conferees intend that the 
Administrator have authority to protect health and the envi-
ronment in such situations.”246 
The statutory language bears out that intent. In other 
words, there was room within this language for the EPA to 
have considered cumulative risk as part of the safety threshold 
analysis. To that end, the Act requires the EPA to regulate 
substances that present an “unreasonable risk of injury to 
health or the environment.”247 In making a finding of “unrea-
sonable risk” the EPA is required to “consider all relevant fac-
tors” including “magnitude of human exposure” and “magni-
 
 243. Id. at 336–37 (quoting Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Train 
Sees New Toxic Substances Law as “Preventive Medicine” (Oct. 21, 1976), 
https://archive.epa.gov/epa/aboutepa/train-sees-new-toxic-substances-law 
-preventive-medicine.html). 
 244. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1341, at 6 (1976). 
 245. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a)(1) (2012). 
 246. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1679, at 61 (1976) (Conf. Rep.). 
 247. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 2604(f ), 2605(a) (2012). 
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tude of environmental exposure.”248 The term “environment” is 
broadly defined to include water, air, and land.249 The term 
“chemical substance” is also broadly defined to include “any 
combination of such substances occurring in whole or in part as 
a result of a chemical reaction or occurring in nature.”250 The 
breadth of language certainly suggests that the fate and 
transport of a chemical substance to humans, to the environ-
ment, and through the environment were relevant factors in 
assessing safety. Indeed, given the importance of cumulative 
risk to the protection of public health on issues of chemicals 
proliferation, one may wonder how agency decisions based only 
on a siloed analysis of individual risks could survive arbitrary 
and capricious review.251 
Though the implementation of TSCA would eventually tell 
a much different story, one in which the Act failed to live up to 
its promise of public health protection, several aspects of TSCA 
made it deserving of advanced praise at the time of its passage. 
Moreover, many of TSCA’s tools could certainly have been use-
ful in the service of assessing cumulative risk. To start, TSCA 
created a national inventory and required all existing and new 
chemicals to be listed on the inventory. It thus aspired to or-
ganize vast amounts of information about what chemicals are 
manufactured, distributed and sold in the United States.252 The 
inventory includes over 84,000 chemicals.253 
In theory, the Act did more than just create a database of 
existing information. It had the potential to create information. 
TSCA gave the EPA the authority to require testing of new and 
existing chemicals where data regarding toxicity is deficient.254 
In particular, § 2603(a) required testing if the manufacture, 
distribution, or use of the chemical may present an “unreason-
able risk of injury” and if there is “insufficient data and experi-
ence” to determine the effect of the substance on health.255 Be-
 
 248. Id. § 2604(b)(4)(A)(ii). 
 249. Id. § 2602(5). 
 250. Id. § 2602(2)(A). 
 251. For a more detailed discussion on this point, see infra Part IV. 
 252. 15 U.S.C. § 2607(b) (2012). 
 253. About the TSCA Chemical Substance Inventory, U.S. ENVTL. PROTEC-
TION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/tsca-inventory/about-tsca-chemical 
-substance-inventory (last updated Sept. 14, 2016) (describing the TSCA In-
ventory, where the EPA is trying to ascertain how many chemicals are actual-
ly being produced today). 
 254. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2603(a), 2604(b) (2012). 
 255. Id. § 2603(a). Manufacturers proposing to make and distribute new 
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cause the Act defines “chemical” broadly,256 the information-
gathering and information-generating potential of the Act was 
substantial.257 As compared to other regulatory approaches that 
came before, TSCA provided a “means for discovering adverse 
effects on health and environment before manufacture of new 
chemical substances.”258 And because “unreasonable risk” was 
broad enough to include issues of cumulative risk, one could 
imagine a world where TSCA’s testing provisions might have 
extended to questions of cumulative impacts. 
Given its broad jurisdictional reach, legislators in 1976 
may reasonably have believed that the Act would help the EPA 
get a handle on the potential chemical exposure for the public 
at large. On paper, the Act had potential and in broad strokes 
contained elements necessary for success. It contained provi-
sions permitting the EPA to gather and organize data about 
tens of thousands of chemicals. It allowed the EPA to require 
additional testing to fill information gaps. It authorized the ban 
of chemicals that pose dangers to health and the environment. 
And it addressed both new and existing chemicals, defined 
broadly to maximize regulatory potential. With the theoretical 
tools provided by Congress through TSCA, one can imagine 
how the Council on Environmental Quality, in 1977, celebrated 
TSCA as a law that “empowers the federal government to con-
trol and even to stop production or use of chemical substances 
 
chemicals were required to submit to the EPA a pre-manufacture notice 
(PMN) along with basic information on chemical properties, uses, production 
levels, and expected exposures. Id. § 2604(a)–(e). The EPA reviewed the infor-
mation and had the authority to require additional chemical testing if it be-
lieved that the product may pose a threat to health or the environment. Id. 
§ 2603(a). The EPA could then refuse to allow the manufacture of the chemical 
if it presents an unreasonable risk of injury. Id. § 2604(f ). In theory, the EPA 
served as a check on the manufacture of all new chemicals. 
 256. The Act defines “chemical substance” to include “any organic or inor-
ganic substance of a particular molecular identity, including—(i) any combina-
tion of such substances occurring in whole or in part as a result of a chemical 
reaction or occurring in nature, and (ii) any element or uncombined radical.” 
Id. § 2602(2). The Act, however, does not apply to chemicals regulated under 
other statutes, which includes pesticides, tobacco, nuclear material, alcohol, 
food, drugs, and cosmetics. Id. § 2602(2)(B). 
 257. In its first year, TSCA regulated over 61,000 existing chemicals. See 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT (TSCA): IM-
PLEMENTATION AND NEW CHALLENGES 3 (2008). 
 258. See Markell, supra note 241, at 345 (quoting S. REP. NO. 94-698 
(1976), which also notes that under other statutes, “the Government regula-
tor’s only response to chemical dangers is to impose restrictions after manu-
facture begins”). 
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that may present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or 
environment.”259 
But despite TSCA’s hype and aspirational goals, the stat-
ute turned out to be a total failure in assessing chemical risk or 
protecting the public from chemicals proliferation. The Act, as 
implemented, did little more than organize incomplete data 
and shift risk-management decisions to the individual consum-
er. While the many failures of TSCA have been well document-
ed,260 less discussed is the Act’s failure to systematically ad-
dress cumulative risk or how that failure to fully assess public 
health risks compounded other structural flaws. And yet, it 
may well be that TSCA’s failure to expressly tackle cumulative 
risk lies at the root of its ineffectiveness. In fact, at least three 
of TSCA’s well-known shortcomings can be traced in some fash-
ion to the failure of Congress or the EPA to expressly adopt a 
cumulative risk lens. 
First, the structure of TSCA largely left the toggle switch 
open by allowing new chemicals to enter the market place un-
less the EPA could show “unreasonable risk.” In fact, despite 
giving the EPA authority to require testing or ban chemicals, 
TSCA allowed the EPA to exercise that authority only after the 
EPA determined that a chemical substance presented an un-
reasonable risk. Since risk is not necessarily apparent without 
testing and adequate information, this threshold created a bit 
of a chicken and egg issue for the EPA. In the end, thousands of 
chemicals entered commerce with no assurance of safety. 
Had Congress more directly tackled chemicals proliferation 
as a collective action problem, perhaps the compounding nature 
of approving each additional chemical would have been more 
appropriately appreciated as part of a portfolio of exposures ra-
ther than as individual, incremental, and independent actions. 
To that end, the more cabined the analysis, often the more in-
significant individual actions have seemed. By contrast, a frank 
recognition of the public health concerns associated with chem-
icals proliferation—one that more deeply appreciated the com-
plexity of the problems created by an open toggle switch—
might have led to a more precautionary approach. For example, 
the European Union’s chemical legislation—REACH261—elected 
 
 259. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: THE EIGHTH 
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 5 (1977). 
 260. See supra note 6 for a sampling of the literature. 
 261. REACH stands for “Registration, Evaluation, and Authorization of 
Chemicals.” Sachs, supra note 6, at 1819.  
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for precaution when it required manufacturers to demonstrate 
safety before chemicals are approved for distribution and 
sale.262 The United States Congress has come around to this 
precaution in the newly adopted Lautenberg Chemical Safety 
Act, which similarly requires the EPA to make a finding of 
safety before a new chemical is approved for market distribu-
tion.263 As Part IV discusses, this change will be important in 
shaping a new place for cumulative risk in the regulatory 
framework. 
In addition to leaving the toggle switch open by placing the 
burden on the EPA to show that a chemical was unsafe, TSCA 
made it too difficult to close that toggle switch even if the EPA 
identified an “unreasonable risk.” This second major failing of 
TSCA resulted from both structural hurdles within the statute 
and implementation gaps imposed by courts. It is also one that 
could have been alleviated with a cumulative risk perspective. 
Structurally, TSCA limited the regulatory choices available 
to the EPA if the agency could show “unreasonable risk.” To 
that end, TSCA set forth seven enumerated options and re-
quired the EPA to choose the least burdensome regulatory 
method necessary to protect adequately against risk.264 While 
chemical bans or use restrictions were options, three of the sev-
en regulatory choices focused on information management. 
Those choices included regulating by marking with warnings or 
instructions, imposing recordkeeping requirements, or requir-
ing manufacturers “to give notice of [the unreasonable risk of 
injury] to distributors . . . and, to the extent reasonably ascer-
 
 262. See id. (“REACH is the first major chemical regulatory regime in the 
world to shift the burden of proof on chemical safety from government to man-
ufacturers, and it requires safety testing for thousands of chemicals on which 
there is limited or non-existent toxicity data in the United States.”). This is 
not to suggest that REACH or the Chemical Safety Act adopted burden-
shifting frameworks because those statutes are otherwise directly targeting 
issues of cumulative risk. In fact, somewhat ironically, REACH has been criti-
cized for taking an individualized approach to chemicals at the same time that 
it has been held out as an example of precaution on its burden-shifting frame-
work. See Denis A. Sarigiannis & Ute Hansen, Considering the Cumulative 
Risk of Mixtures of Chemicals – A Challenge for Policy Makers, 11 ENVTL. 
HEALTH SUPPL. 1 (2012). 
 263. See H.R. 2576 § 5(g) (2016) (“If the Administrator finds in accordance 
with subsection (a)(3)(C) that a chemical substance or significant new use is 
not likely to present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environ-
ment, then . . . the submitter of the notice may commence manufacture of the 
chemical substance or manufacture or processing for the significant new use 
. . . .”). 
 264. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (2012). 
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tainable, to other[s]” and “to give public notice” of such risk of 
injury, and to replace or repurchase the chemical from the peo-
ple who have been so warned if they elect.265 Because TSCA re-
quired the EPA to choose the least burdensome method neces-
sary, even when the EPA made a finding of “unreasonable risk 
of injury,” the Act placed a presumption in favor of regulatory 
avoidance, namely regulation through information disclosure. 
In doing so, the Act expressly made it more difficult for the 
EPA to choose public health protection through actual, sub-
stantive gatekeeping (e.g., chemical bans or use restrictions). 
There is no better example of this presumption in favor of 
avoidance than the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Corrosion Proof 
Fittings v. EPA, where the court famously rejected the EPA’s 
rule banning asbestos upon concluding that the agency failed to 
consider the least burdensome alternatives to a complete ban. 
This ruling came in response to ten years and thousands of 
pages of documentation regarding the dangers posed by asbes-
tos.266 The Fifth Circuit’s ruling reflects, in part, the structural 
flaws of TSCA. At the same time, the Fifth Circuit’s ruling may 
have generated an unnecessarily high hurdle to chemicals reg-
ulation, one not reflected in congressional intent. To that end, 
despite the significant study and documentation by the EPA on 
the risks posed by asbestos, the court separately ruled that the 
EPA had failed to provide substantial evidence of an “unrea-
sonable risk of injury.”267 Ordinarily, the substantial evidence 
standard for reviewing an agency’s factual determination is not 
considered a high evidentiary hurdle,268 but in the context of 
TSCA review the court concluded that the EPA’s ten-year study 
of the impact of asbestos on human health and its accompany-
ing in-depth analysis of this known carcinogen were not enough 
to warrant regulation under TSCA. Tellingly, the court cau-
 
 265. Id. 
 266. Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991). 
 267. Id. 
 268. See, e.g., Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951) (set-
ting out the standard for “substantial evidence” review of factual determina-
tions made through formal adjudication under the APA); Ass’n of Data Pro-
cessing Serv. Orgs. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 745 F.2d 677, 
684 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“We have noted on several occasions that the distinction 
between the substantial evidence test and the arbitrary or capricious test is 
‘largely semantic.’”); cf. Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1213 (“Contrary 
to the EPA’s assertions, the arbitrary and capricious standard found in the 
APA and the substantial evidence standard found in TSCA are different 
standards, even in the context of an informal rulemaking.”). 
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tioned that “Congress did not enact TSCA as a zero-risk stat-
ute.”269 
After that decision, the EPA effectively concluded that § 6 
is largely unenforceable. Rather than continue to pursue its au-
thority to restrict or ban chemicals, the EPA turned to volun-
tary approaches to address risks.270 Notwithstanding the hype, 
the words offered by Russell Train in 1976 upon adoption of 
TSCA are as true today as they were forty years ago: “Most 
Americans had no idea, until relatively recently, that they were 
living so dangerously. . . . They had no idea that, without their 
knowledge or consent, they were often engaging in a grim game 
of chemical roulette whose result they would not know until 
many years later.”271 
It is worth noting that the EPA might have alleviated the 
shortcomings of TSCA had it routinely considered cumulative 
risks as part of the safety inquiry. If a finding of “unreasonable 
risk” were based in part on cumulative exposures, the EPA 
might also have reasonably discounted regulatory choices root-
ed in information disclosure. In addition, by fully assessing 
public health risks from cumulative exposures the EPA may 
have stood a better chance at educating the courts on the public 
health need for chemicals regulation. When viewed as a neces-
sary tool for addressing a collective action problem, rather than 
as a limit on marketplace activity, courts may have been more 
amenable to an “unreasonable risk” threshold that would have 
 
 269. Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1215. 
 270. In 2011, as part of an educational series sponsored by the Environ-
mental Law Institute, the EPA’s Director of the Office of Pollution Prevention 
and Toxics explained that: 
[T]he Agency has only successfully invoked § 6 five times since 1976. 
The most ambitious attempt to use § 6 was in the 1980s, when there 
was an attempt to ban most uses of asbestos, a known human carcin-
ogen. That attempt was overturned in litigation that resulted in addi-
tional burdens on Agency action under TSCA. Since the early 1990s, 
the Agency has not used the provision of TSCA that allows us to ad-
dress unreasonable risks from existing chemicals. Given the difficul-
ties of using some of TSCA’s regulatory tools, the Agency has pursued 
various voluntary and stewardship approaches to address risks from 
chemicals. 
Wendy Cleland-Hamnett, Dir., EPA Office of Pollution Prevention and Toxics, 
Panel Discussion at the Environmental Law Institute, TSCA Reform: The 
Standard of Safety (July 21, 2011), in 41 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 
11081, 11083 (2011); see also Angela J. Levin & Maria V. Souder, In a World 
Without Congressional Reform: A New (Old) Role for EPA Under TSCA Section 
6, 29 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 12 (2015) (summarizing TSCA’s poor track rec-
ord). 
 271. Russell Train, Former Administrator, U.S. EPA 1973–1977.  
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reduced collective risk over time. This is an example of how, in 
the end, the fact that cumulative risk has been a blind spot in 
the implementation of TSCA may have weakened its effective-
ness on multiple levels and exacerbated structural flaws. 
In light of the many shortcomings of TSCA, the collection 
of criticisms of TSCA found political traction and spurred Con-
gress to action and a new Act—the Frank R. Lautenberg Chem-
ical Safety for the 21st Century Act—was signed into law by 
President Obama on June 22, 2016. This new Act replaces 
TSCA as the new chemical regulatory regime for the U.S. mar-
kets. Part IV explains how that new legislation eliminates 
some of TSCA’s shortcomings and how it can be implemented to 
more fully embrace issues of cumulative risk than its predeces-
sor. 
B. FIFRA: MORE PROMISES UNDELIVERED 
While TSCA regulates chemical substances, it is a gap-
filler statute; it regulates where other statutes do not. One ma-
jor class of chemicals to which TSCA does not apply is pesti-
cides.272 Similarly, the Chemical Safety Act will not modify pes-
ticides regulation. Rather, the EPA will continue to regulate 
pesticides under the Federal Insecticide Fungicide and Rodent-
icide Act (FIFRA). Unlike TSCA, FIFRA has not been the re-
cent target of any major reform efforts. But that is not to say 
that FIFRA takes a particularly strong approach to the protec-
tion of public health from chemicals exposure. Like TSCA, 
FIFRA suffers from heavy reliance on information disclosure as 
the primary vehicle for pesticide regulation. And, like TSCA, 
the combination of statutory mandates and incentives created 
by FIFRA have resulted in relatively little gatekeeping despite 
theoretical promise. So while FIFRA in theory more directly 
tackles issues of aggregate exposure, the implementation gaps 
that plague FIFRA leave substantial room for improvement. 
A bit of FIFRA’s history helps explain where the gaps in 
this area of regulation have been and where they continue to 
be. The origins of FIFRA are quite telling. When it was enacted 
 
 272. See 15 U.S.C. § 2602(2)(B)(ii) (2012) (excluding from TSCA regulation 
chemicals that are “manufactured, processed, or distributed in commerce for 
use as a pesticide”). In addition, TSCA does not apply to foods, food additives, 
cosmetics, and drugs that are regulated by the Federal Drug Administration 
(FDA) under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. See id. 
§ 2602(2)(B)(vi). 
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in 1947, FIFRA was a licensing and labeling law.273 Like the 
law that it replaced (the 1910 Federal Insecticide Act), FIFRA 
“protected farmers and consumers against fraudulent products” 
by promoting labeling uniformity and honesty.274 In short, it 
sought to ensure that pesticides actually killed pests.275 Written 
under the heavy influence of industry,276 FIFRA generally al-
lowed for the quick registration of pesticides with few regulato-
ry or informational requirements.277 To complete the picture, 
consider that FIFRA was administered by the USDA, an agen-
cy widely accepted to serve the interests of the agricultural lob-
by and chemical industry.278 
As originally enacted, FIFRA did little to address public 
health-related concerns. The use of pesticides was rampant 
(over 300 million pounds of pesticides were produced in 
1950),279 and yet, health consequences of eating foods sprayed 
with chemicals did not enter the regulatory picture until 1954. 
At that time, Congress amended the Food Drug and Cosmetic 
Act to create a program for setting safety limits for pesticide 
residues in food.280 However, the laws continued to overlook a 
 
 273. Stephen D. Otero, The Case Against FIFRA Preemption: Reconciling 
Cipollone’s Preemption Approach with Both the Supremacy Clause and Basic 
Notions of Federalism, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 783, 785 (1995). 
 274. Pamela A. Finegan, FIFRA Lite: A Regulatory Solution or Part of the 
Pesticide Problem?, 6 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 615, 623 (1989) (citing S. REP. NO. 
346 (1988)). 
 275. Anthony J. Nownes, Interest Groups and the Regulation of Pesticides: 
Congress, Coalitions, and Closure, 24 POL’Y SCI. 1, 2 (1991) (“The goal of 
[FIFRA] was to ensure that a pesticide was able to kill the pests that the 
manufacturer purported it did.”). 
 276. See Christopher J. Bosso, Transforming Adversaries into Collabora-
tors: Interest Groups and the Regulation of Pesticides, 21 POL’Y SCI. 3, 5 (1988) 
(“The 1947 Act emerged out of close cooperation among members of the House 
Committee on Agriculture, USDA officials, and representatives of the major 
pesticides manufacturers—a classic ‘iron triangle’ in the words of 
subgovernment theorists.”); see also Albert H. Meyerhoff, Frightening Tale of 
Dinoseb Is Rule, Not Exception, in the World of Pesticides, L.A. TIMES (July 25, 
1988), http://articles.latimes.com/1988-07-25/local/me-4548_1_dinoseb-ban 
(“FIFRA, written largely by and for the agrichemical industry, has not been 
seriously amended in 16 years and is severely flawed.”). 
 277. See Finegan, supra note 274, at 616 (examining a GAO report from 
1986 that concluded pesticides registered before 1972 underwent inadequate 
testing). 
 278. See id. at 619 (“During the 1940s, the farm bloc seized power and in-
creased its support of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
with new programs and increased budgetary support.”). 
 279. See id. at 619. 
 280. Id. at 622 (explaining that the FDA implemented the safety limits be-
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host of other public health and environmental concerns associ-
ated with prolific pesticide use, including farm worker safety,281 
groundwater contamination,282 and public parks. 
By the early 1970s, Rachel Carson had famously spotlight-
ed the risks of pesticides to humans and the environment in 
her book Silent Spring,283 and public concerns grew forceful 
enough to bring about substantial congressional change.284 It 
was in reaction to public pressure that Congress adopted major 
amendments to FIFRA in 1972. The authority for implement-
ing FIFRA was transferred to the EPA, a newly created agen-
cy.285 
Along with the transfer of power came a number of new 
provisions more directly addressing public health and the envi-
ronment. For the first time, the EPA was given authority to re-
ject the registration of pesticides that posed an “unreasonable 
adverse risk” to the environment.286 The EPA was also given 
authority to cancel registrations of existing pesticides, albeit 
with a rather large caveat: the EPA was required to indemnify 
manufacturers, distributors and retailers for unused product if 
registrations were cancelled.287 Issues of cumulative exposure 
were not directly addressed. 
Despite the 1972 amendments, FIFRA continued to draw 
criticisms from public health and environmental advocates.288 
By the mid-1980s criticisms to FIFRA bore a striking resem-
blance to some of the current criticisms of TSCA. Concerns in-
 
cause the EPA was not created until 1970). 
 281. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-00-40, PESTI-
CIDES: IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED TO ENSURE THE SAFETY OF FARMWORKERS 
AND THEIR CHILDREN (2000). 
 282. See Finegan, supra note 274, at 625 (citing 1987 congressional hear-
ings for the claim that the EPA had detected groundwater contamination from 
pesticides in twenty-four states). 
 283. RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962). 
 284. See Bosso, supra note 276, at 4. 
 285. See Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970 § 2(a)(4), 35 Fed. Reg. 15623 
(Oct. 6, 1970). 
 286. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a) (2012). 
 287. EPA History: FIFRA Amendments of 1988, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION 
AGENCY, https://archive.epa.gov/aboutepa/epa-history-fifra-amendments-1988 
(last visited Apr. 24, 2017); see also Nownes, supra note 275, at 10–11 (describ-
ing the indemnification provisions and the structural barriers they raised to 
regulation). 
 288. See Finegan, supra note 274, at 625 (explaining that among the gen-
eral public, pesticide residues was the number one consumer concern in a 1988 
poll conducted by the Food Marketing Institute.). 
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cluded the completeness and adequacy of scientific data availa-
ble to the EPA when evaluating new pesticides for public safe-
ty;289 the large number of existing pesticides that continued to 
be used despite little knowledge regarding public health im-
pacts;290 the disincentives that agency indemnification created 
to cancelling pesticide registrations;291 and the fact that “pesti-
cides were innocent until proven guilty.”292 There were many at-
tempts to change the status quo but with little success. As one 
prominent political scientist remarked in the late 1980s: “To 
resolve a policy battle that all agree only perpetuates an unac-
ceptable status quo may require yet another scandal or unfor-
tunate incident.”293 
It was not until 1993, when the National Academy of Sci-
ences released a report on the vulnerability of infants and chil-
dren to pesticide residues on food that Congress was again mo-
tivated to pay attention.294 That report, Pesticides in the Diets of 
Infants and Children, concluded that approaches used by the 
EPA to set pesticide tolerance levels insufficiently protected in-
fants and children. The report made several recommendations, 
including that the EPA determine tolerances based on health, 
not agricultural cost-benefit; that the EPA develop toxicity 
studies evaluating neurological, immune and reproductive vul-
nerabilities of infants and children; and that the EPA include a 
safety factor when data is inadequate to evaluate toxicological 
 
 289. See Richard M. Dowd, FIFRA Update, 17 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 415A 
(1983). 
 290. As the L.A. Times reported in 1988: “FIFRA, written largely by and for 
the agrichemical industry, has not been seriously amended in 16 years and is 
severely flawed. Thus, under its provisions, hundreds of ‘old,’ largely untested, 
pesticides continue to be used. (Ninety percent of the 2.6 billion pounds of pes-
ticides used annually in the United States have never been adequately tested 
for chronic health effects like cancer, birth defects and nerve damage, accord-
ing to the National Academy of Sciences.)” Meyerhoff, supra note 276; see also 
Finegan, supra note 274, at 617 (explaining that while the 1972 FIFRA 
amendments required the EPA to reregister the 35,000 pesticide products in 
existence at the time, fourteen years later the EPA had “completed review of 
only five active ingredients” out of 600 in need of review). 
 291. Finegan, supra note 274, at 634 (providing for statistics on how much 
cancelling pesticides cost the EPA in the late 1980s). 
 292. Nownes, supra note 275, at 8. 
 293. Bosso, supra note 276, at 18. 
 294. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, PESTICIDES IN THE DIETS OF INFANTS AND 
CHILDREN (1993); see also Kristina Thayer & Jane Houlihan, Pesticides, Hu-
man Health, and the Food Quality Protection Act, 28 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 257 (2004) (detailing Congress’s efforts to pass the Food Quality 
Protection Act). 
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risk to infants and children.295 Most notably, the report recom-
mended that the EPA consider risks from exposure to “multiple 
pesticides with a common toxic effect.”296 Moreover, the risks 
should be calculated by considering the total exposure from 
both dietary and non-dietary routes.297 
Ultimately, in 1996 Congress responded to public concerns 
and enacted the Food Quality Protection Act (FQPA).298 Under 
that Act, the EPA must set a maximum residue, or tolerance, 
limit before a specific pesticide can be used on a food crop.299 
The tolerance limit is the amount of pesticide residue allowed 
to remain in or on each treated food commodity. In setting tol-
erances, the EPA must make a finding that the tolerance is 
“safe.” A tolerance is defined as “safe” if there is a “reasonable 
certainty that no harm will result from aggregate exposure to 
the pesticide residue.”300 These aggregate exposure assessments 
must specifically account for the particular vulnerability of in-
fants and children.301 
By passing the FQPA, Congress directly addressed issues 
of aggregate exposure. In this way, FIFRA and the history of 
 
 295. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 294, at 9. 
 296. Id. at 11. 
 297. Id. 
 298. Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–170, § 405, 110 
Stat. 1513, 1514–35 (1996) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 346(a)(2000)). 
 299. The power of the EPA to set such tolerances comes from § 408 of the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA). Setting Tolerances for Pesti-
cide Residues in Food, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/ 
pesticide-tolerances/setting-tolerances-pesticide-residues-foods (last visited 
Apr. 24, 2017); Summary of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, ENVTL. 
PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/summary-federal 
-food-drug-and-cosmetic-act (last visited on Apr. 24, 2017). 
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tecting and measuring levels of the pesticide residues so regulatory officials 
can ensure that any residues are at or below the level found to be safe. Id. 
 301. § 346a(c)(2)(A)(ii). 
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pesticide regulation serve as useful starting points for thinking 
about issues of common toxicity and cumulative risk more 
broadly—beyond pesticides and residues. At a minimum, the 
pre-amendment history of the FQPA shows that scientists have 
recognized the importance of considering aggregate risk for 
nearly three decades. 
While the safety limits required under FQPA are a step in 
the right regulatory direction, and while other areas of chemi-
cals regulation could benefit from similar requirements to per-
form aggregate risk assessments, FIFRA’s bright spots have to 
be put into context of the statute’s overall limits. In other 
words, the fact that the EPA must consider aggregate exposure 
to pesticide residues on food does not mean that FIFRA, or 
FQPA, has been successful in addressing public health issues 
related to pesticide exposure. 
Even setting aside the fact that the implementation of 
FQPA has been described as “disappointing” by some schol-
ars,302 FQPA is limited in scope. Importantly, cumulative risk 
assessments are more sophisticated tools than the aggregate 
risk assessments required by the FQPA. Aggregate exposure 
assessments, in contrast to cumulative risk assessments, simp-
ly evaluate a single chemical or pesticide across multiple expo-
sure routes.303 An aggregate assessment, for instance, might 
study the impacts of benzene on a given community by study-
ing the combined impact from all sources of benzene. At its 
core, the aggregate assessment is still single-stressor; it looks 
only at the impacts of benzene, not benzene as combined with 
other carcinogens or non-chemical stressors.304 In other words, 
aggregate risk assessments do not consider how the studied 
chemical behaves in a matrix of other chemical stressors or 
what level of risk is posed to a population from the combination 
of many chemicals through multiple exposure routes over long 
periods of time. Understanding the difference between cumula-
tive and aggregate risk assessments highlights the limitations 
 
 302. See McGarity, supra note 6, at 147–202 (detailing FQPA’s implemen-
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of even current regulatory attempts to move beyond single-
stressor, single-pathway assessments. 
In addition, the mandates to set safety limits or to consider 
aggregate risk apply only to pesticide exposure through food 
residues. These public health protections do not apply to a 
whole host of other human health and ecological issues associ-
ated with pesticide use. As an example of FQPA’s limited scope, 
consider the fact that it does not address farm worker safety,305 
nor does it protect families of farmworkers or rural communi-
ties from pesticide drift.306 
Urbanites fair no better under FIFRA’s framework. Con-
sider that over eighty million pounds of pesticide active ingre-
dients are used on U.S. lawns each year.307 By some estimates, 
pesticides used in homes and on residential lawns rival agricul-
tural use on a per acre basis.308 Unless these pesticides are also 
licensed for use on foods, they are not tested for chronic or ag-
gregate health effects. For example, MCPP, the third-most 
heavily used herbicide in the United States, is not approved for 
food use and therefore has not been assessed for aggregate risk 
under the FQPA framework.309 Last year, risks to families from 
pesticide-driven lawn care inspired one county in Maryland to 
ban homeowners from using pesticides on their lawn.310 That 
this measure regulated private lands was unusual. States like 
Connecticut have banned the use of certain pesticides on public 
lands, but have prohibited localities from regulating pesticide 
use on private lands.311 
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Keep in mind that these state-adopted measures, aimed at 
reducing pesticide exposure by reducing pesticide use, are not 
driven by the federal regulatory framework. As Professor Wen-
dy Wagner and Lynn Blais have observed, “[T]he actual envi-
ronmental application and use of . . . pesticides . . . is not regu-
lated at all on the federal level.”312 Rather, while FIFRA 
requires registration and compliance with labeling, the regula-
tion on pesticide use is left to the states.313 Many states have 
failed to fill that gap.314 Because of the impacts of pesticide pro-
liferation on the ambient environment, discussed below, this ad 
hoc approach is not adequate to address the scope of the prob-
lem. As Professor Wagner and Blais have observed, FIFRA’s 
regulatory gaps have created a “legal blindspot” that leaves en-
vironmental threats to children’s health woefully un-
addressed.315 
Together these examples highlight that, outside of the food 
residue context, FIFRA leaves many potential exposures to pes-
ticides unregulated and unexamined. To be sure, FIFRA does 
give the EPA authority to ban or restrict the use of pesticides 
that would cause “unreasonable adverse effects on the envi-
ronment.”316 In fact, FIFRA requires product manufacturers 
seeking to register pesticides to show that the new pesticide or 
new use meets this safety standard before pesticides are ap-
proved to enter the market.317 In theory, this burden-shifting 
framework sounds good. Indeed, it is adopted by the European 
Union’s chemicals legislation—REACH—and has been similar-
ly part of the successful effort to reform TSCA.318 
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FIFRA’s bite, however, remains weak despite the fact that 
it places the burden of showing safety on industry. One reason 
is that, like TSCA, a finding of “unreasonable adverse effects” 
must consider environmental, social, and economic costs. By 
entwining the safety threshold with economic considerations, 
this standard puts a thumb on the scale of pesticide prolifera-
tion and shifts the focus away from longer-term public and eco-
logical health. In particular, the cost-benefit component makes 
substantive regulation of widely used pesticides difficult given 
that bans will often carry significant economic costs while so-
cial and environmental benefits will be harder to quantify.319 In 
addition, cost-benefit analysis is only as good as the infor-
mation available to properly value costs and benefits. 
Even if FIFRA’s measure of “unreasonableness” were tied 
solely to health risks, the effectiveness of FIFRA’s safety 
standard would still be limited by information gaps. Several 
scholars have noted the limited toxicity testing available to 
evaluate pesticide safety. For example, the EPA has been criti-
cized for failing to “require full-scale neurodevelopmental tox-
icity testing, even for neurotoxic pesticides.”320 The guidelines 
that do exist fail to adequately consider long-term degenerative 
effects of pesticide exposure, which is a particular concern for 
children. Effects on the immune system and endocrine system 
similarly suffer from lack of information and testing. These in-
formation gaps are even more pronounced in older pesticides 
that were on the market before FIFRA was enacted.321 
One of the culprits for FIFRA’s information gaps is the 
EPA’s conditional registration authority.322 Notably, no aggre-
gate risk assessment is required under FQPA for conditional 
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registrations.323 Moreover, FIFRA’s burden-shifting provisions 
do not apply to the conditional registration process, which by 
its design allows the EPA to register pesticides without full 
safety data.324 
Ostensibly, registrants have between one and four years to 
provide the missing information.325 Whether this information is 
actually submitted within the required timeframe, however, is 
a bit of mystery. A 2013 Government Accountability Office 
study found major problems with the EPA’s method for track-
ing pesticide registrations.326 This study was prompted by envi-
ronmental groups claims that the “EPA had overused condi-
tional registrations” to the point where “conditional 
registrations represented the majority of active registra-
tions.”327 And based on information collected through Freedom 
of Information Act requests, the group raised concerns that 
some 3200 pesticides had been in conditional status since 1995 
and 2100 had been in conditional status since 1990.328 Some of 
these claims were confirmed when the EPA’s Office of Pesticide 
Programs (OPP) conducted an internal review in 2011 that de-
termined sixty-nine percent of active pesticide registrations 
were conditionally registered. Keep in mind that conditional 
registrations represent the pesticides that are being sold and 
used in the United States without adequate safety data. 
The state of conditional registrations is both more compli-
cated and disturbing than the OPP information suggests. When 
the GAO followed up on these claims in 2013, the GAO uncov-
ered a deeper problem: “OPP lacks a reliable system specifically 
to track the status of conditional registrations to ensure that 
additional required data are submitted timely, and that OPP 
reviews that data.”329 In other words, OPP was not able to say 
how many of its conditional registrations were subsequently 
backed by adequate safety data and how many had fallen 
through the regulatory cracks. Indeed, OPP reported that each 
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of its twenty product managers used a variety of methods to 
track information regarding the status of conditional registra-
tions, “including electronic spreadsheets or reminder notices, 
handwritten notes, and memory.”330 With this kind of ad hoc 
approach, mistakes and oversights are bound to arise. Not sur-
prisingly, the GAO Report provides some examples that leave 
one to question the seriousness with which OPP treats issues of 
pesticides and the public health: 
For example, in the case of a pesticide product containing the active 
ingredient Foramsulfuron, conditionally registered in November 
2002, two required studies on the effects of this pesticide on terrestri-
al and aquatic plants that were due in December 2004 had not been 
submitted 10 years after the conditional registration was issued, as 
determined by OPP’s registration review of this pesticide in 2012. In 
another case, involving a pesticide product containing the active in-
gredient Acetamiprid, conditionally registered in March 2002, OPP 
discovered during its registration review of this pesticide in 2012, 
about 10 years later, that it had received, but not reviewed, a study 
related to the effects of this pesticide on honeybees. OPP documents 
indicate the registrant submitted this study in 2001, even before OPP 
granted the conditional registration. Acetamiprid belongs to a class of 
pesticides called neonicotinoids that some beekeepers, environmental 
groups, and others suspect of having adverse effects on honeybees.331 
The summary lesson is troubling: for almost forty years the 
EPA has been bypassing the safety standard under FIFRA 
without assurances that information gaps would be closed in 
any timely fashion, or at all. Needless to say, the EPA’s wide-
spread use of conditional registrations supports the origins of 
FIFRA as a weak regulatory regime concerned mainly with reg-
istration and labeling; one not founded on the expectation of 
having much teeth in terms of public health protection. Indeed, 
the EPA’s approach to conditional registrations is a troubling 
example of Professor Donald Hornstein’s observation that “pes-
ticide regulation is not . . . a body of law that addresses in any 
strategic way the underlying prevalence of pesticides in Ameri-
can agriculture, nor is it a body of law designed to minimize 
pesticide use.”332 Conditional registrations also illustrate a 
deeper pathological problem with FIFRA—ones where the ad 
hoc regulatory approach reflects a disregard for the serious 
public health issues associated with widespread pesticide use. 
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IV.  A PATH FORWARD (AND SOME HURDLES)   
While this Article is primarily dedicated to the thesis that 
cumulative risk analysis needs to be at the regulatory forefront, 
this Part sketches a path forward. In particular, it offers a 
home—a legal hook—for cumulative risk in the existing statu-
tory landscape: when assessing whether impacts are “unrea-
sonable” under the applicable safety standards, the EPA should 
make cumulative risk part of that assessment. In fact, one 
could certainly argue that the EPA must take cumulative risks 
into account in order to survive judicial review. Though fairly 
straightforward in terms as matter of legal interpretation, 
identifying a legal hook is not in itself a solution unless some 
underlying equitable concerns are addressed. This Part, there-
fore, concludes by cataloging the practical policy challenges 
that regulators will have to tame in order for cumulative risk 
assessments to translate into risk reduction strategies. 
A. SAFETY THRESHOLDS AS THE KEYSTONE TO REGULATING 
CUMULATIVE IMPACTS 
The most direct and obvious step toward integrating cumu-
lative risk assessments into the existing regulatory frameworks 
would be for the EPA to consider cumulative risks as part of 
regulatory safety thresholds. Both FIFRA and the Chemical 
Safety Act of 2016 support this approach. 
1. “Unreasonable Risk” and the Chemical Safety Act of 2016 
Under the Chemical Safety Act of 2016, the EPA has the 
authority to regulate chemicals that “present an unreasonable 
risk of injury to health or the environment, without considera-
tion of costs or other nonrisk factors.”333 This safety threshold of 
“unreasonable risk” is similar to the one that governed under 
TSCA and is broad enough to support the consideration of cu-
mulative risk; indeed, the legislative history of TSCA reflects 
Congress’s desire to do just that. And in passing the Chemical 
Safety Act of 2016, there is no indication that Congress intend-
ed to take a narrow view or otherwise exclude the consideration 
of cumulative risk. In fact, the Chemical Safety Act includes 
several statutory provisions that strengthen the EPA’s authori-
ty to restrict chemical use under the new Act. 
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The most obvious way that Congress strengthened the 
safety threshold is the prohibition against considering “cost or 
other nonrisk factors” when evaluating safety. By making clear 
that the safety threshold is a health-based determination, Con-
gress took an express step toward public health protection and 
signaled its desire to approach chemicals regulation as a public 
health issue foremost. Because cumulative risk lies at the heart 
of public health, it stands to reason that the including cumula-
tive risk in the safety assessment would be consistent with 
Congress’s directive to assess risk on the basis of health. 
Notably, the Chemical Safety Act does not abandon consid-
erations of the economic consequences of regulations altogeth-
er. Once the EPA determines that a chemical substance pre-
sents an unreasonable risk, the EPA must consider, as part its 
rulemaking, the benefits of the chemical substance and the 
economic consequences of any proposed restrictions.334 Unlike 
TSCA, however, the Chemical Safety Act does not require a 
formal cost-benefit analysis nor does it require the EPA to 
make decisions based on that analysis. Rather, the Chemical 
Safety Act simply directs the EPA to factor economic conse-
quences “to the extent practicable” in the agency’s selection of 
prohibitions and restrictions.335 The latitude afforded to the 
EPA to prescribe restrictions under the Chemical Safety Act, 
and the Act’s deletion of a cost-based decision model, is further 
example of Congress’s intent to support health-based determi-
nations under the Act. 
In addition, the Chemical Safety Act opens the door for the 
EPA to consider cumulative risk in safety determinations in 
another critical regard. Namely, in an attempt to fix TSCA, 
Congress shifted the burden of proving safety of new chemicals 
to industry. Now, like FIFRA and the EU’s REACH legislation, 
a manufacturer can only start making and selling a new chemi-
cal under the Chemical Safety Act if the EPA has determined 
that the new chemical “is not likely to present an unreasonable 
risk of injury to health or the environment.”336 Relatedly, the 
EPA must impose restrictions necessary to protect the public if 
the new chemical presents or may present an unreasonable 
risk, if the EPA lacks sufficient information to make a safety 
determination, or if the chemical is produced in large amounts 
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and results in large releases or exposures.337 By contrast, under 
the old TSCA, manufacturers were generally free to start mak-
ing and distributing a new chemical unless the EPA deter-
mined that the chemical posed an unreasonable risk within the 
ninety day window. 
This burden shift signals a new era of precaution in chemi-
cals regulation and provides the EPA with the opportunity to 
be more thorough in its risk evaluations. Consider that under 
the old law, the EPA had ninety days to make a safety deter-
mination and the EPA had the burden of proving a new chemi-
cal was unsafe. Under those circumstances, the EPA might 
reasonably have shied away from cumulative risk analysis, 
both because of the time and because of the uncertainty. After 
all, when the EPA bore the burden of proof, uncertainties 
would have undermined the EPA’s ability to regulate. In other 
words, when the EPA had the burden of proving that a chemi-
cal presented an unreasonable risk, the EPA may very well 
have concluded that the dearth of information on issues of cu-
mulative exposure would not permit the EPA to make a deter-
mination of “unreasonable risk” on that basis. 
Now that the burdens are flipped, the EPA actually has the 
opposite problem. Whereas uncertainties historically prevented 
the EPA from barring the manufacture of new chemicals, the 
EPA cannot reasonably conclude that a new chemical is safe 
unless uncertainties are resolved and unless more information 
is known about cumulative risks. In fact, because cumulative 
risk responds to the actual, real-life risks that chemicals pose, 
there is no logical reason why the burdens of proving safety 
should not reflect that full suite of actual risks.338 
There are two final aspects of the Chemical Safety Act of 
2016 that support the adoption of a cumulative risk perspective 
to public health. First, the Act requires the EPA to base its de-
cisions on “the best available science.”339 As risk science evolves 
to provide a fuller suite of tools and methodologies for assessing 
cumulative risk, the EPA’s obligation to use that science is 
mandated by this “best science” provision. 
Second, the Chemical Safety Act requires the EPA to in-
clude certain discussions in its risk evaluations. Notably, the 
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EPA is required to “describe whether aggregate or sentinel ex-
posures to a chemical substance under the conditions of use 
were considered, and the basis for that consideration.”340 While 
this provision stops short of requiring the EPA to conduct a 
cumulative risk assessment, it certainly reflects Congress’s 
awareness that issues of aggregate exposure are relevant to 
risk evaluations. When read in light of the “best available sci-
ence” mandate, it creates a structure whereby the EPA will 
have to justify any decision to exclude such information. 
For all of these reasons, the EPA should systematize its 
use of cumulative risk assessment under the Chemical Safety 
Act. The timing of such a move is good. The Act requires the 
EPA to develop risk evaluation regulations within a year of the 
Act’s effective date. While the ossification of rulemaking will 
likely extend this timeframe, these are the issues that ought to 
be on the EPA’s agenda as it sets those risk evaluation proto-
cols for the future. 
2. “Unreasonable Adverse Effects” and FIFRA 
Similar to the Chemical Safety Act, the EPA is authorized 
under FIFRA to limit the distribution, sale or use of a pesticide 
“to prevent unreasonable adverse effects to the environment.”341 
And like the Chemical Safety Act, nothing in the language of 
FIFRA suggests that cumulative exposures fall outside the 
safety thresholds. FIFRA’s safety standard, in fact, is already 
borne out of a conception of the environment as a series of in-
terconnected and interacting parts. In particular, FIFRA’s safe-
ty standard turns on the effects to the environment, where en-
vironment is broadly defined to mean “water, air, land and all 
plants and man and other animals living therein, and the in-
terrelationships that exist among these.”342 
To the extent that Congress intended to narrow the impact 
of FIFRA’s safety threshold, that narrowing was not in the con-
sideration of biological effects. Rather, Congress narrowed the 
impact of FIFRA’s regulatory bite by requiring regulatory deci-
sions to balance public health risks with economic and social 
benefits of pesticide use. To that end, FIFRA defines “unrea-
sonable adverse effects on the environment” as “taking into ac-
count the economic, social, and environmental costs and bene-
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fits of the use of any pesticide.”343 It is this balancing that ulti-
mately will limit the usefulness of the cumulative risk analysis. 
To be clear, however, the statute does not prevent regulators 
from taking full account of the risks. And it stands to reason 
that the balancing of risk and benefits cannot properly take 
place without a full understanding of the risks in their social 
context. 
*** 
Given the breadth of the safety standard under both regu-
latory frameworks, the unreasonableness of risks should neces-
sarily turn on real-world exposures and public health impacts. 
Logic dictates that cumulative risks would be part of that as-
sessment. In fact, given the advancements in risk science and 
the frank acknowledgement by regulators that questions of 
cumulative risk are highly relevant to public health burdens, 
the failure of the EPA to consider cumulative risks, even if on a 
qualitative level, could be grounds for legal challenge. In other 
words, not considering cumulative risks might reasonably give 
rise to a claim that the agency engaged in arbitrary and capri-
cious decision-making for failure to consider all the relevant 
factors.344 
In Michigan v. EPA, the Supreme Court held that the EPA 
failed to consider all relevant factors when it failed to consider 
cost in the first step of regulating mercury emissions from pow-
er plants.345 The Court observed that cost is so obviously a fac-
tor in the usual regulatory calculus that it must be considered 
when determining whether regulation is “necessary and appro-
priate” under the Clean Air Act.346 Like cost, assessing cumula-
tive risk is clearly a key ingredient in the understanding of 
public health risks from chemicals and pesticide regulation. 
And, like the Clean Air Act’s regulatory threshold (“appropriate 
and necessary”), the safety thresholds of FIFRA and the Chem-
ical Safety Act invite a broad consideration of risks. It stands to 
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omitted)).  
  
2017] REGULATING CUMULATIVE RISK 2391 
 
reason, that under the arbitrary and capricious rulemaking 
standard, the EPA must systematically consider cumulative 
risks when evaluating safety. 
B. HURDLES TO REGULATING CUMULATIVE RISK 
Risk science supports a more central role for cumulative 
risk. The statutes contain an obvious regulatory hook. Rational 
decision-making demands that all relevant factors be consid-
ered. So, why then, hasn’t cumulative risk assumed a more cen-
tral role in assessing chemicals and pesticide safety? What 
makes the policy lag behind the science? I suggest that there 
are two major types of hurdles that cause policy to lay behind 
science. The first is informational. The second centers on net-
tlesome questions of equity. 
1. Informational Hurdles 
Though approaching chemicals regulation through a cumu-
lative risk lens would better serve public health, there is one 
significant reason why taking a cumulative risk focus may have 
been difficult under TSCA and FIFRA even if the EPA had 
wanted to: information gaps. In particular, making a risk find-
ing requires data regarding chemical toxicity and exposure. 
Data, however, is not so easy to come by.347 Fewer than 200 
of the 61,000 “existing” chemicals grandfathered into the TSCA 
inventory have been reviewed by the EPA for human health 
risks.348 In 1998, the EPA released a study that revealed shock-
ingly little information was known about High Production Vol-
ume (HPV) chemicals, which are those chemicals produced or 
imported into the United States in excess of 1,000,000 lbs. per 
year.349 In particular, of the 3000 HPV chemicals, there was no 
publicly available toxicity information for forty-three percent of 
the chemicals, and a full set of basic toxicity data for only seven 
percent.350 Since that time, the EPA has been engaged in the 
HPV Chemical Challenge and has partnered with the chemical 
industry to obtain greater information.351 The results have been 
mixed. 
 
 347. Wagner, supra note 19. 
 348. Ekey, supra note 51, at 171–72. 
 349. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CHEMICAL HAZARD DATA AVAILABILITY 
STUDY (1988). 
 350. Id. at 6. 
 351. See David W. Case, The EPA’s HPV Challenge Program: A Tort Liabil-
ity Trap?, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 147, 160–61 (2005) (describing the pro-
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For new chemicals, where manufacturers have been re-
quired to submit chemical information as part of the registra-
tion process, one might anticipate a different situation. In ac-
tuality, few manufacturers submitted complete information for 
new chemical review. The EPA estimates that only about fif-
teen percent of companies report any health or safety data.352 
Most fail to report test data of any sort.353 Information gaps for 
pesticides are similarly disheartening.354 
One can imagine these information gaps have contributed 
to the agency’s reluctance in considering cumulative risk at all. 
In fact, during the same year that the Fifth Circuit dealt a har-
dy blow to TSCA in the Corrosion Pipe Fittings case, the Citi-
zens for Better Environment filed a TSCA case in the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Illinois on an issue 
involving cumulative risks. The Center filed a petition request-
ing that the EPA use its TSCA authority to require coke plants 
on the South side of Chicago to test the cumulative and syner-
gistic interactions of eleven different chemicals emitted from 
the facilities.355 While the Center argued that the cumulative 
impacts presented an unreasonable risk under TSCA, the EPA 
denied the petition on the grounds that “the commencement of 
cumulative and synergistic testing of the 11 identified sub-
stances, as well as of other chemical substances and mixtures—
is not scientifically feasible.”356 Notably, neither the EPA nor 
the testifying experts argued that cumulative risks were inap-
propriate under TSCA’s safety standard; only that the testing 
protocols had not advanced to the point where such inquiries 
would be useful. 
Given that the Fifth Circuit had rejected the EPA’s efforts 
on the regulation of asbestos, which had been supported by ex-
tensive scientific evidence, one can sympathize with the EPA’s 
reluctance to wade into the more scientifically difficult waters 
of cumulative risk assessment.357 With the adoption of the 
Chemical Safety Act, however, the EPA has a tremendous op-
 
gram). 
 352. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, OPTIONS FOR ENHANCING THE 
EFFECTIVENESS OF TSCA 7 (2009). 
 353. Id. 
 354. See Wagner & Blais, supra note 312. 
 355. Citizens for a Better Env’t v. Reilly, No. 85-C-8000, 1991 WL 95040, at 
*3 (N.D. Ill. 1991). 
 356. Id. 
 357. See supra notes 231–34 and accompanying text. 
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portunity to make progress on understanding cumulative risk. 
Because the Chemical Safety Act takes the major step of shift-
ing the burden of proving safety to manufacturers, it allows the 
EPA to set the terms of rational risk evaluation and ask manu-
facturers to fill in the information gaps accordingly. To the ex-
tent uncertainties continue to exist within the risk assess-
ments, regulators can use safety factors to account for 
cumulative impacts.358 At least in this way the cumulative risk 
issues are part of a systematic analysis. By contrast, burying 
one’s head in the sand simply shifts the perception of what the 
problem really is. 
Once the EPA asserts its authority to consider cumulative 
risk as part of the safety thresholds under the Chemical Safety 
Act and FIFRA, it stands to reason that the information-
generating authorities afforded by those Acts could be deployed 
as tools for filling in some information gaps on cumulative 
risks. In this way, the step of regulating cumulative risk 
through the safety threshold becomes the regulatory driver 
necessary for furthering the understanding of cumulative risk 
as well. The regulatory landscapes under which we exist might 
finally break free of the endless cycle of avoiding this critical 
issue for lack of information. 
2. Policy Hurdles 
Moving from risk identification to risk reduction, there are 
a cadre of nettlesome policy questions that regulators and 
scholars will have to wrestle with. In a nutshell, issues of cu-
mulative risk raise a host of very difficult fairness concerns 
about which chemicals should be regulated and by how much. 
When all the other arguments and explanations have been laid 
on the table, these are the ones that cause commitments to cu-
mulative risk to stray. 
Consider, for instance, a scenario in which regulators un-
dertake a cumulative risk assessment for endocrine disruptors 
and determine that the combined effects on public health are 
unreasonable. What then? Which chemicals, and on what basis, 
should the regulator seek to reduce that risk? Banning all en-
docrine disruptors would be untenable. But even if regulators 
sought to ban or restrict some of the endocrine disruptors, that 
 
 358. See Sargiannis & Hansen, supra note 262, at 5 (“One way to deal with 
the general lack of knowledge about interactions in a cumulative risk assess-
ment context is to use an additional uncertainty factor accounting for potential 
synergy effects.”). 
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determination could be made on the basis of several factors: 
which chemical is most toxic, the volume of the chemical in 
commerce, the usefulness of the chemical to social life, or the 
chemical that was the first to enter the marketplace. Regula-
tors might also give priority to the chemicals that are well stud-
ied, even if those studies uncover some risks. 
Deciding which approach to take or how to appropriately 
weigh the various risk criteria is beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle.359 For now, consider that similarly daunting problems of al-
locating responsibility for combined impacts are not new to en-
vironmental law. The Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)360 has 
been regulating toxic soup for decades. At times, that law has 
required the EPA and courts to allocate clean up liability for 
Superfund sites among hundreds of parties for adverse impacts 
generated by countless different chemicals. While the Act holds 
potentially responsible parties jointly and severally liable, 
courts must nonetheless allocate liability among solvent par-
ties. In making that allocation determination, courts look to the 
“Gore factors,” which include equitable considerations like the 
amount of hazardous waste contributed to the site, the degree 
of toxicity of the waste, the degree of care exercised by the vari-
ous parties, and the degree of cooperation in working with reg-
ulators to prevent harm.361 Similarly, under the Clean Water 
Act’s TMDL program, regulators are tasked with working 
backward from an unacceptable ambient water quality, identi-
fying the relevant point and nonpoint sources of water pollu-
tion, and developing an equitable distribution of discharge al-
lowances so that the end goal—clean water—is ultimately 
met.362 The same approach undergirds the Clean Air Act’s regu-
lation of NAAQS and the EPA’s new Clean Power Plan. 
The fact is that environmental problems are collective ac-
tion issues at heart. Thus, regulating necessarily means sorting 
out issues of equitable distribution of cumulative impacts. The 
real difference between these other environmental regulatory 
 
 359. For a law and economics discussion of how pollution can be distributed 
among the population to reduce risk without reducing the total amount of pol-
lution, see Arden Rowell, Allocating Pollution, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 985, 1008 
(2012). 
 360. 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (2012). 
 361. See John Copeland Nagle, CERCLA, Causation, and Responsibility, 78 
MINN. L. REV. 1493, 1522–23 (1994) (explaining the Gore factors and alloca-
tion process). 
 362. See HOUCK, supra note 3 for a description of TMDLs. 
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programs and the ones that have historically been implemented 
for chemicals and pesticides is one of commitment, not difficul-
ty. In that sense, the first step to effective chemicals and pesti-
cide regulation may be shedding the notion that issues of cumu-
lative risk in this context are unique or therefore excused from 
serious attention. 
  CONCLUSION   
To argue that understanding cumulative risk is necessary 
is not is to say that regulating cumulative risk is easy. In fact, 
programs in other environmental laws dealing with cumulative 
risk have proven difficult to implement. At the same time, the-
se are the issues that drive to the heart of public health protec-
tion and cannot be ignored simply because they pose difficult 
issues. The EPA acknowledges as much in its Framework: 
“[L]imitations in methods or data should not be seen as a con-
venient reason for completely ignoring or not posing questions 
for which stakeholders may be seeking answers.”363 
To that end, even in a world with complete information for 
any individual product, managing risk from chemicals exposure 
is beyond the control of the individual consumer for two fun-
damental reasons. First, individuals cannot reasonably be ex-
pected to self-assess the aggregate or cumulative risk profiles of 
some endless combination of products. Second, we have reached 
a point in our industrial economy where the ambient environ-
ment poses exposure risk. That is, the manufacture, distribu-
tion, use, and release of chemicals from everyday products and 
ubiquitously used pesticides have generated ambient risk in 
the greater environment. The individual consumer is not able 
to opt out of certain risks even with perfect information. To-
gether these reasons make chemicals regulation a public health 
issue. 
This may seem an intuitive enough point. And in fact there 
are entire fields of scientific study and institutions—e.g., the 
National Institute of Environmental Health and Safety—
devoted to understanding the health implications of prolific 
chemicals and pesticide use. Unfortunately, federal legislation 
governing chemicals exposure through consumer products and 
pesticide use has failed to support that basic intuition. But it 
need not. This Article offers a critical starting point for regulat-
ing cumulative risk—it has laid the foundational arguments for 
 
 363. EPA, FRAMEWORK, supra note 10, at 33. 
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why we should. It has also begun to sketch the guiding frame-
work for how we can. That leaves the question of whether we 
will. 
